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ABSTRACT
Security in embedded system design, which has long been a critical problem for en-
suring the confidentiality, data integrity and system reliability for embedded system
designers and users, is now facing a new dimension of threat from the attacks on
hardware. As the IC design reaches sub-micron regime, increased sensitivity of de-
vice under environmental condition has made some new types of attacks possible,
while the analysis and detection for design vulnerabilities against these attacks are
harder on the much more complicated designs nowadays. In the meanwhile, more
efficient and diverse attack methodologies are developed by attackers as the technol-
ogy advances. On the other hand, embedded system has limitations on the hardware
resources and power consumption which can be allocated for preventive or defensive
countermeasures. The future trends of system development, including cloud comput-
ing, distributed network and internet-of-things (IoT) are also pushing the edge of such
limitations on embedded system designs. Low cost, high efficiency, and flexible hard-
ware security design methodologies are needed for the current IC production flow as
well as the future application scenarios. In this thesis, we’re presenting several efforts
made towards low cost and high efficiency embedded hardware security design and
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analysis. First, the finite state machine based circuit vulnerability analysis frame-
work is proposed. Second, we demonstrated a secure scan architecture design which
utilizes novel property of memristor devices. Lastly, a side channel resilience design
methodology is presented for FPGA bitstream protection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The security of embedded system has been drawing a lot of attention especially as the
form of the systems become more and more diverse and ubiquitous. Ranging from cell
phones, computers, network routers, to smart dishwashers, networked sensors, smart
vehicles and wearable devices, the current embedded systems are providing critical
functionalities which are prone to be sabotaged and to cause serious harm. These
systems are used to capture, store, process and transfer sensitive data, and hence
pose unique challenges to the security designers. In the past decades, numerous
efforts have been made to define the concepts and address the challenges of “Cyber
Security”, “Information and Privacy”, “Critical Infrastructure”, “Networks” and so
forth. Comprehensive security technologies including crypotographics, authentication
and security protocols, anti-virus mechanism and firewalls have been well established
and understood. However, the never-stopping development of embedded system is
always adding new security challenges. On the other hand, while the major security
concerns are solved from software and protocol perspectives, recently there are more
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attacks reported by taking advantage of hardware design defects and vulnerabilities.
The hardware security of embedded system has rapidly become a new and critical
design dimension where research effort is required.
1.1 Embedded system security background
The security concern in an embedded system varies between different entities and
different user case scenarios. For instance, the end-users are often concerned about
the privacy of personal data stored on their device and sent to the server, or whether
the downloaded content is from trusted source; While the content or service provider
might be more concerned with the secrecy of the proprietary and copyrights. The
same entity can play multiple roles depending on the different user cases. The security
requirement for embedded system design is the combination of all these requirements
that apply.
1.1.1 Security primitives
With a variety of tools and technologies, attackers can break into embedded sys-
tems from hardware or software, and cause undesired consequences such as system
malfunctioning, information leakage, privilege abuse and denial of service. The tar-
get of reported attacks often includes the cryptographic key, firmware, data storage,
system configuration and identification. These are the security assets which need
to be protected by security designers. For example, the encryption/decryption key
of a cryptographic system is often stored on-chip in non-volatile memory, such as
Read-Only Flash. However, the content of the key can be revealed by analyzing
2
Figure 1.1: Locations of typical security assets on a modern embedded system
the algorithm, eavesdropping data transmission or reverse-engineering. Once the key
is revealed, the entire authentication mechanism will be bypassed. And as for the
firmware, which includes low level instructions and configurations that need to be
protected both by its content and the updating process. The Fig. 1.1 presents the
typical components of a modern embedded system and where the targeted security
assets are located. Many critical assets, such as cryptographic key or user data are
subject to attacks at many different locations in the system when different attack
model is applied.
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1.1.2 Multi-layered security system
In order to meet the security requirements from different aspects, modern embedded
system needs multi-layered protection mechanism. First, the Root-of-Trust (RoT)
needs to be established which ensures the booting process starts from a trusted source.
The RoT can be built on the strategies such as by using one-time or non writable
memory, or by defining trusted memory zone. For example, the Intel Boot Guard
technology utilize cryptographic to verify the initial boot block, and the manufacturer
is required to generate key bits for the initial boot verification. Second, secure key
protection and management is critical to the security of a system. Popular mecha-
nisms, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is used to store, protect and manage
keys used for encryption or authentication purposes. But the key management still
remains as an open problem when it comes to more complicated scenarios, such as in
Internet-of-Things (IoT), or in distributed systems.
The third layer of the system security is to protect the processor and memory
space, as well as the data storage. Technologies should be applied to prevent mal-
functions injected by malicious users, such as stack overrun or buffer overflow. Some
common security mechanisms are designed at this layer, such as Address Layout Ran-
domization, where the virtual memory space layout is randomized in order to prevent
attackers to understand the memory and hence deliberately force calls to cause buffer-
overflow; And also the memory space can be marked with different executable config-
urations where certain area is reserved only for verified programs. On the other hand,
the data storage and transmission need to be protected by cryptography modules and
other security mechanisms. Designs with different security requirements should be
specified with different levels of compliance. For instance, the FIPS 140-2(Federal
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Information Processing Standard) specifies four levels of compliance:
• Level 1, basic security mechanism with only cryptographic modules and no
physical security mechanism required;
• Level 2, improved from level 1 and requires features which shows evidence of
tampering, such as using tamper-evident coatings;
• Level 3, tamper detection and response design is required which attempts to
prevent intruder from gaining access to critical security parameters;
• Level 4, highest level of security. Tampering from any direction is protected
at high probability. And besides, the system is protected from failures due to
rigorous environment condition or environmental fluctuations.
Lastly, the embedded systems need to be protected on the physical layer, which is
also the main concern of this thesis. As modern embedded system has more ubiqui-
tous forms than before, it’s becoming easier for malicious parties to gain access to the
physical devices. For example, internet of things (IoT) devices in many scenarios are
placed remotely without any safeguards. Once the on-premises device is comprised,
the chain effect could be spread through network. In the meanwhile, physical pos-
session of the device allows attackers to bypass the security mechanism built on the
software and protocol level, or provides side information which makes it much easier
to break the system. The attacks reported based on the hardware can be mainly cat-
egorized as invasive or non-invasive, while security mechanisms are required against
all possible attack scenarios.
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1.2 Scope of this thesis
In this thesis we focus on addressing some challenges in secure embedded system
designs, and propose several studies aiming at low cost and low redundancy security
technologies. Before that, it is important to provide some background on the attack
models and discuss the design challenges which concern the development of modern
embedded system security.
1.3 Hardware attack models
Hardware has long been considered as a trusted party. It’s viewed as a platform
runs the instruction passed from software and obeys any security rules built on the
software layer. Given that assumption, the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has
also been considered as a safe environment and nowadays the supply chain is divided
into many entities including IP designer, foundry, SOC integrator and consumer, so
that the complex modern SOC design and manufacturing can be managed. Given this
fact, the complexity of the supply chain also introduce more risks when the hardware
security becomes a concern. As mentioned before, the reported attacks on hardware
layer can be invasive or non-invasive.
1.3.1 Invasive attack
The invasive attacks are launched directly on the device and the security primitives
are accessed by means such as micro probing or reverse engineering. These attacks
are common on embedded systems on both circuit boards and SOCs, although SOCs
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do require a little more sophisticated techniques and equipment to reverse engineer.
A typical invasive attack consists of the following steps:
• Depackaging. Dissolve the resin covering the silicon and remove the chip
package;
• Layout Reconstruction. Reconstruct the system layout by removing inter-
nal layers and using equipment such as a microscope. The layout can be re-
constructed at different granularity. Initial attempts reveal the architectural
structure such as location of memory and processor, as well as data buses;
With more effort, details of lower structure can also be extracted.
• Microprobing. Microprobing or e-beam microscopy can be used to observe
the values on the buses and interfaces on the component boundaries.
1.3.2 Non-invasive attack
While the invasive attacks need to be prevented at the silicon manufacturing level,
the circuit and system designers should be more aware of non-invasive ones. In the
meantime, it’s worth noting that the initial steps of invasive reverse engineering can
be utilized to start a non-invasive attack. For instance, reconstructed layout is useful
when attacker want to monitor the electromagnetic radiation as side-channel of the
chip activity. The invasive attack models that’s most seen in the reports can be
classified into following categories:
7
Trojan injection
Hardware Trojans are circuit modifications or extra logic added in the design by ma-
licious users which can be triggered after the Trojans infected circuit is implemented
in the system. They’re designed in a way that they can stay inactive during regular
circuit functioning until the designated triggering condition is detected. Therefore,
hardware Trojans are hard to detect during regular testing since the functional test
and random stimulus are unlikely to trigger the Trojan circuit. The hardware Trojan
has become a serious threat to the IC designs security, since the third party resources
in hardware circuit design are prevailingly used in the modern IC supply chain. In
order to minimize the time-to-market of complex SOC designs, the roles of chip man-
ufacturer, designer and integrator, which once was the same party, are now more
and more separated and spread around the globe, exchanging designs in forms of
soft/hard IPs. The designers and consumers are vulnerable against Trojan insertion
from untrusted IP providers and manufacturers.
Previous studies discussed the taxonomy of hardware Trojans and classified them
based on their physical characteristics, activation characteristics and action charac-
teristics [1]. The physical characteristics reflect the impact of circuit modification
in terms of size or number of components, physical layout structure, timing and
power traces. The activation characteristic specifies the type of activation criteria
and whether it’s externally or internally activated. For example, a hardware Trojans
can be connected to the temperature sensing logic so that it will be triggered when
the device is operated at a certain temperature range. Or a Trojan can be triggered
internally by inputting a particular sequence. The disruptive behavior of hardware
Trojans can also be classified by different action characteristics. By targeting differ-
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ent security primitives as we discussed in the previous section, hardware Trojans may
aim at modifying the functionality, specification or the transmission on the targeted
device. To fully understand hardware Trojans’ physical, activation and action char-
acteristics is essential to establish a comprehensive defense mechanism where Trojan
insertion can be detected, disabled and prevented.
Fault injection
As the modern ICs are scaling down to the sub-micron regime, the implemented
circuits are becoming more and more sensitive to environmental conditions. These
conditions include temperature change, power supply fluctuation, electromagnetic
radiation and intensive light illumination. Hence, by manipulating the conditions
where the device is operating, attacker can introduce faults intentionally and alter
the functional behavior. With different fault injection techniques, the injected faults
could be in forms of time delay, stuck-at and single event upset (SEU) or multiple
events upset (MEU). Many fault injection attacks focus on altering the device outputs
in order to malfunction the system, or apply differential analysis on the output data
so that hidden information can be retrieved. On the other hand, some other attacks
inject faults on the control path aiming at altering the control sequence such as
skipping a particular instruction. This is a more powerful attack model since the
attack complexity can be greatly reduced if the control logic is comprised. In addition,
the attacks on the control logic may allow attacker to breach the privilege settings
which help them to bypass the security mechanism entirely.
To precisely control the process of fault injection, expensive equipment is often
required. For example, the experimental setup used in [2] introduces the minimum
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requirements for setting up fault injection using electromagnetic wave disturbance.
A high power pulse generator is used and paired with a magnetic antenna to trigger
faults on the target device. The system is mounted on the high precision motorized
stage for controlling the targeted area. However, we’ll discuss in this thesis that how
the characteristic of the circuit design can determine the impact of injected faults, so
that randomly introduced faults can also be used to breach the security. Depending
on the technology being used, some fault injection attacks require invasive steps (ie.
depackage the chip and apply high intensity light illumination), while some are non-
invasive such as manipulating the power or clock.
Side channel analysis
Side channel analysis (SCA) is a group of non-invasive attack methods where design
specifications are revealed by physical characteristic of device operation, such as power
or timing traces, or through test/debug channels. The most common victims of SCA
are cryptographic modules. Modern cryptographic algorithms are very well designed
and understood so that it’s almost impossible to break at the algorithm level. How-
ever, when the algorithm runs on the hardware, the device activities are dependent
on the critical information hidden in the device which can be observed through side
channel links. The nature of vulnerability of cryptographic algorithms against SCA
is that the iterative computation, foundation of data confusion and diffusion, can be
broken down to separate steps with side channel observations. For example, the test-
ing infrastructures such as scan chain or JTAG boundary scan interface are widely
reported as means of side channel attack on a variety of cipher designs [3] [4] [5].
In [5] a typical scan-based SCA attack is presented against AES device. The access
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to the scan mode allows attacker to take a screenshot of the computation results of
intermediate round stored in the state registers and shift it out from scan output.
This means the attackers can isolate the algorithm in the first round, manipulate
input and output until resolving the respective round-key, and then move forward
with the known previous round as input to resolve for the next round. Following this
manner, the complexity of breaking the cryptographic system, who’s algorithms are
well understood by the public, is reduced to the minimum.
1.4 Embedded system hardware security design state-
of-art
The importance of security in embedded system, as Kocher and et al [6] [7] discussed in
their works, has become a new and critical design dimension to the modern embedded
system designs. As we discussed in previous sections, the reported vulnerabilities and
attacks against the hardware side of the system emphasized the hardware security as
an extra layer in addition to the traditional system security design.
1.4.1 Security methodology in modern IC design flow
In section 1.3, we introduced a variety of hardware attack models. Given by the fact
that the current SOCs are usually designed, integrated, and manufactured by separate
parties, the untrusted parties who can conduct these attacks include many entities
throughout the IC production flow, which includes IP vendor, designer, manufac-
turer, and malicious users. The development of security mechanism against hardware
attack is a complex task with subjects covering from early system and circuit design
11
Figure 1.2: Security design methodologies at different IC design flow
stage to IC post-market applications. In Fig 1.2 we’re presenting the modern in-
dustry standard IC design flow and the security design requirements with respect to
each different stage. From the designer’s perspective, a system design should have a
complete set of security protocols, authentication mechanisms and well-understood
security assets depending on the system specification and application scenarios. And
then, during each stage the production flow, these security elements should be prop-
erly designed, verified, integrated, fabricated and tested. The efforts are required
from aspects which includes, but are not limited to, the development of new counter-
measure schemes, such as masking, obfuscation, and temper resistance design; devel-
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opment of novel CAD flow to evaluate the security assets and design vulnerabilities
at early design stage; Trojan detection software during integration and built-in-self-
test (BIST) design for later application security; Verification and formal verification
mechanisms with security primitives taken into account; Obfuscation, circuit harden-
ing and temper resistance design during fabrication; DFT security design and testing
for security.
1.4.2 Design challenge and research state-of-art
Embedded system designer always need to struggle with the computational demand
of security processing and the limited computation capability. Introducing security
elements to design, which already has constraints on cost, power and resource utiliza-
tion, will only lead to more trade-off between security versus cost, or security versus
performance. Moreover, recent trends in computation and communication technology
are leading to more resource constrained and diverse embedded system hardware. For
example, cloud computing and future communication technology such 5G are aiming
at bringing more computation tasks to the server. In this case, the end device’s role
will be shifted towards data collector, display, transmitter and receiver which has
remote connection to computation unit and data storage in the cloud. In the mean-
while, the connection between devices are more decentralized and the placement of
devices are ubiquitous. This means security designers need to deal with more extreme
cases where very low power and compact device which can be publicly accessed can
still require high level of security coverage.
Therefore, it’s important to develop embedded system security solutions which are
low cost, low redundancy and high efficient. To achieve this goal, studies and design
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efforts are needed from several aspects. First, security design should be planned at an
early stage as possible. For example, if Trojan insertion can be identified by effective
flow before integration, any potential damages are prevented. Besides usually the cost
of countermeasures implemented at the design stage is much lower than it is in the
later fabrication. Second, development of novel devices and technologies are needed to
satisfy the increasing security and performance requirements. This includes utilization
of new device characteristics, novel architecture and protocol design, development
and implementation of new algorithms, and so forth. Third, flexibility needs to be
considered at every stage of defense mechanism. With strict restrictions on the cost
and performance, the flexibility of security countermeasure used in modern embedded
system has become an important factor so that their implementation can be adjusted
to different application scenarios and fit for the diversity of the device forms.
CAD for security
CAD tools play essential roles throughout the IC production flow. In order to ensure
the system security, well developed CAD tools and flows are required during each
stage of IC production. Vulnerability definition and assessment should be carried
out following aspects. First of all, a comprehensive security rule check mechanism
needs to be established to ensure and enhance security at early design phase. In
Nahiyan’s work [8], primitives of developing the framework for security rule check
has been discussed in detail. Security rules and assets, as a new dimension of the
design checking metrics, should be defined by understanding the different aspects of
security requirements and potential attacks. This can include understanding of the
attack targets and models, the potential adversaries, the source of vulnerabilities and
14
more. With these primitives as guidelines, research work is needed in terms of security
metric definition, design vulnerability analysis, and security strategy development.
One important part of CAD design for hardware security is pre-silicon Trojan de-
tection. We have discussed before that hardware Trojans can be categorized by their
characteristics in terms of physical appearance, activation and action. And accord-
ingly, the detection methods can be applied at pre or post silicon phase, on physical
device or high level abstraction model. At pre-silicon phase, Trojan detection mainly
rely on analyzing the physical layout. This is because that Trojan insertions and their
activities leading to abnormal chip behavior, which is hard to test functionally, can
be revealed by side-channel traces such as power and timing, and hence side-channel
based analysis is the most common methodology for detecting the existence and ac-
tivation of hardware Trojans. In Salmani’s study [9], a layout level Trojan injection
vulnerability analysis is presented. Physical design inevitably leave empty regions on
the chip (white space), which is often utilized by malicious party for injecting Trojans
so that the Trojan’s footprint is minimized. Therefore, white space based analysis is
an essential step to evaluate the chip’s vulnerability against Trojan injection. On the
other hand, the injected Trojans can also reside amid the normal logic. This requires
the activation logic of the Trojan to be connected on nets with very low transition
probabilities (for power based Trojans), or uncritical path with small path delays
(for delay based Trojans). In another word, these low transition probability nets and
non-critical paths can be considered as design vulnerabilities against Trojan injection,
hence, should be included as security evaluation metric during layout analysis.
The vulnerability analysis also includes some formal methods at the early design
stage. Finite state machine (FSM), which is the most common model used for circuit
and system level behavior, has been widely used for formal verification of circuit func-
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tionality correctness. The theory can be extended for security assets verification. For
instance, the work in [10] presented a case study of model checking based verification
to estimate system vulnerability against device errors. On the other hand, the imple-
mentation of FSM based control modules also reveal potential system vulnerability
against Trojan injection, fault injection, and failures as discussed in [11] [12].
1.4.3 Physical-Unclonable-Function (PUF) and device entropy
PUF is group of devices where the variation of fabrication process is leveraged to gen-
erate real random numbers or device entropy. A PUF function takes a challenge and
outputs a device specific and unique response accordingly. Since the process varia-
tion is truly random and uncontrollable, every device will have it’s unique physical
feature that can not be cloned. Hence such features can be viewed as the fingerprint
of the device, and used for cryptographic system and device identification at low im-
plementation cost. One common type of randomness leveraged by PUF design is the
variation on time delay. At sub-micron regime, two identically designed gates will be
manufactured with slightly different doping concentration, size and threshold volt-
age, which is significant enough to have different gate delays. Hence two functionally
equivalent device will have different time delay traces. Special circuit components,
such as Ring Oscillator [13] or arbiter [14] can be used to amplify the delay differences
and make them detectable. Therefore, it extracts the process variation ad translate
them into unique device ID. Another commonly leveraged process variation is the
threshold voltage mismatch. For instance, the six-transistor symmetric structure of
SRAM cell determines that the manufactured cells will have unbalanced threshold
voltage between the ON/OFF sides. This reflects to a random ”0” and ”1” sequence
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at SRAM array at power-up which is unique to the device. The SRAM-based PUF
then can be utilized as a low cost and secure solution for key generation and storage.
Moreover, randomness features introduced by novel devices can also be exploited for
PUF design. For instance, memristor device, which is a fast speed, low power and high
density memory device that is actively studied as the future memory device candi-
date. Memristor device has some undesired feature including process variation caused
data storage instability and destructive read caused drifting effect, yet are utilized
to develop memristor based PUF device and random number generators [15] [16].
The ”forgetting effect” of the memristor array has also been exploited for the security
of neuronetwork in Yang’s work [17] and for secure scan infrastructure design in our
previous studies [18].
1.4.4 Obfuscation and masking
Obfuscation and masking based countermeasures rely on introducing randomness to
the design in order to protect system from reverse engineering, data eavesdropping
and side channel leakage. Obfuscation can be applied on algorithms, control path,
data path, physical layout, manufacturing and circuit design. At algorithm level,
masking is the most common and through protection measure against side channel
leakage of cryptographic systems. Typical masking schemes applied on symmetric
cryptographic algorithms are presented as in [19] [20]. A random mask is introduced
into each step of cryptogrphic algorithm, additively or multiplicatively, in order to
hide the correlation between side channel traces and the key value. The difficulty
of masking the cryptographic systems in embedded system implementation is due
to the high circuit complexity of masking algorithm especially for the non-linear
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computation steps. Adding and removing mask on non-linear computation, such as
s-box, can easily double or triple the original design size, and compensate the design
performance at the same time. Therefore, low cost, flexible and efficient masking
designs and scheme are important for the realization of side channel resilience in
embedded hardware designs.
In the mean time, other obfuscation schemes in reported works are also adding
more dimensions for the overall system security protection. For example, in [21]
obfuscation is applied on the data path of AES circuit, by adding remapping Look-
Up-Table (LUT) to protect it from scan based side channel attack. And adding scan
chain obfuscation is the most common strategy for scan security. By randomly in-
serting gates, or scrambling the order of deliberately divided sub scan chains, the test
data is obfuscated to unauthorized party to prevent them from leveraging the test
infrastructure for malicious purposes. Similarly, logic encryption based techniques
are also used to insert additional XOR gates or LUTs at random circuit intercon-
nections for obfuscation purpose [22]. Obfuscation techniques can also be beneficial
during board level design. In [23], a framework of obfuscation on the PCB level is
presented for the resilience against non-destructive board level reverse engineering.
The proposed framework exploited the programmable components on board, such
as Micro-controller unit, DSP, and FPGA to work as a permutation block and hide
connection between components. With the obfuscated interconnections, the design
on board is only available to users with a correct key. On fabrication level, obfusca-
tion schemes can be developed relying on novel materials and fabrication process to
improve chip’s resilience against destructive reverse engineering [24].
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1.5 Security in programmable device
In general, the design of embedded system hardware tend to become more and more
flexible, so as to meet the increasing demand for the variation of application scenarios
and resource limitations. On the other hand, the rapid development of programmable
hardware, especially FPGA device, is leading this trend towards designs at a higher
complexity and a bigger scope. Abundant works have been done implementing sys-
tem on programmable hardware and optimizing the resource allocation of hardware-
software co-design. Given the fact that the mainstream FPGA devices (ie. Xilinx 7
series) are already implemented with 28nm technologies and support over 2 million
logic gates, it’s safe to say that the future hardware will be more and more ”software
like”. Therefore, to fully understand the security of programmable devices as well the
programmable device based designs is critical for the next generation of embedded
system.
The most common security problem in FPGA devices is the protection of bit-
stream. By far, the most popular type of FPGA device is based on SRAM. Since
SRAM is a type of volatile memory, the configuration bitstream needs to be externally
stored in some nonvolatile boot memory, such as Flash. The safety of this bistream file
is essential to the FPGA program as it contains all design details which can be used
to fully reverse engineer the design, and the FPGA system is subject to the threats
such as cloning, over − building, tampering and spoofing if the bitstream file is in-
secure. The apparent vulnerable link through the bitstream transmission is from the
boot memory to the FPGA configuration memory during boot process. Therefore,
the bitstreams for security sensitive programs are normally secured by cryptographic
systems. Data encryption is applied after generating the bitstream, and then it will be
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decrypted on chip when it’s downloaded to FPGA. Major FPGA vendors, including
Xilinx, Altera and Microsemi, have all proposed their bitstream protection schemes
and authentication mechanisms based on symmetric ciphers. However, side channel
attacks can still be conducted on FPGA devices to break the biststream protection.
Hence, the security of FPGA also requires to be considered from various aspects in-
cluding side channel resilience, tamper resistance, anti-reverse engineering and more.
While the unique ”software like” characteristics of FPGA and other programmable
hardware devices introduce unique security design challenges as such devices are de-
signed with general purposes and can be implemented in to any design. For instance,
the Trojan injection may have different forms on FPGA which can not be identified
by typical power and timing testing. Specific security design flow needs to be estab-
lished for system implemented or partially implemented on programmable devices, in
order to ensure the overall system trustability, confidentiality and data integrity.
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, a finite state machine (FSM)
based probabilistic analysis framework for analyzing IC design vulnerabilities is pre-
sented. The framework provides a general discussion of the potential risks related to
state transition paths and state transition features under fault injection attacks. In
addition, low cost mitigation scheme is demonstrated which can be used for security
enhancement at early design stage. In Chapter ??, we present a novel secure scan
chain architecture exploiting the true random memory retention loss effect of mem-
ristor devices. The design utilizes the unique properties of memristor devices and
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achieves low overhead, true random and highly compatible obfuscation on scan data
to defend embedded system design against scan based side channel attacks. And in
Chapter 4, a design is presented addressing the overhead problem of masking the side
channel leakage during FPGA bitstream encryption/decryption. The proposed design
takes advantage of dynamic partial reconfiguration feature of modern FPGA devices,
introduced a new FPGA boot-up flow, so that the masking mechanism can be dy-
namically included for low redundancy and flexible masking implementation. Lastly,
we summarize and discuss the research impact of proposed approaches in chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Probabilistic Evaluation of
Hardware Security Vulnerabilities
2.1 Introduction
As the rapid advance of semiconductor technology scaling, integrated circuits and sys-
tems have become more and more susceptible to noise and environmental variations.
Manufacture flaws, such as doping defects and material impurity, can be activated by
varying environmental conditions much easier than before, which could lead to mal-
functions or even failures in embedded systems. Moreover, it is becoming a security
threat that malicious users can take advantage of varied environmental conditions to
attack hardware devices. Reports have shown that attackers are able to break into
various devices including cryptographic systems such as AES and RSA ciphers by
accurately controlled fault injection followed by fault analysis [33], [34], [35].
A lot of conditions are critical to sub-micro level circuits, for example, power fluc-
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tuation, temperature change, electromagnetic pulse, intensive light illumination [34], [33], [36], [37].
Fault injection techniques are developed initially to validate the function of the device-
under-test (DUT) and detect design weakness in the occurrence of faults, such as time
delay, stuck-at, and single-event-upset (SEU). The purpose of conventional fault in-
jection experiments is to find whether a device will fail or produce errors while still
working. Therefore, the influence of the faults is usually considered at the device
output [38], [39].
However, when fault injection is used as a mean of hardware attacks, the attacker’s
goal is not just to fail the device at the output, but also to disturb device operation in
order to create side channels, steal key information, and access privileged instructions.
To fully understand the influence of the induced faults on device dynamic behaviors,
it is necessary to have an analytical model of inner state transitions for the device
under attacks, which has been ignored in the conventional study of fault injection or
high-level function validation.
Finite state machine (FSM), as a general model for digital design, is very useful
to verify the device functionality at a higher level. It is a common practice to design
a complex circuit function from its FSM abstraction. For example, the FSM-based
formal verification is well studied to determine the correctness of circuit functionality.
Also, it is possible to use FSM model checking based techniques to identify vulnerable
registers that may cause erroneous outputs [10], [40]. In this paper, we propose a
probabilistic evaluation approach based on the FSM model to study the security
vulnerabilities in digital circuits. We will leverage the probabilistic FSM model to
identify the intrinsic design vulnerabilities under fault injection attacks and develop
effective techniques to mitigate them. The contributions of our work lay mainly in
the following aspects:
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• First, we perform a study on the influence of environmental conditions on system
behaviors and treat faulty state transitions as a new design metric for hardware
security;
• Second, we propose a formal algorithm that can discover the security vulnera-
bilities in digital circuits at the Register Transfer level (RTL) during the design
stage;
• Third, we develop an effective FSM encoding scheme to enhance the security of
critical states with very small hardware overhead.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
work. In Section 3, we provide the motivation of this work and discuss the existing
fault injection attacks. The probabilistic faulty transition model and the re-encoding
scheme for mitigating the design risk are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Simulation results are evaluated in Section 6 to demonstrate the improvement in
security resilience and the induced design overhead. A case study is also discussed in
this section. Section 7 gives the conclusions.
2.2 Related Work
Fault injection attacks can be classified into three categories. The first type of attacks
introduce logic errors that may alter the output of a circuit. The second one is so-
called differential fault analysis usually aimed at retrieving the key of crypto systems
by comparing correct outputs with faulty ones. The last group modifies control logic
by skipping or replacing instructions through introduced errors. In practice, most
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successful fault injection attacks are a combination of the above. Depending on dif-
ferent fault models, accuracy of process control, and characteristics of the underlying
device, various methods have been reported to successfully attack the mainstream
ciphers such as AES (typical symmetric key cipher) and RSA (typical asymmetric
key cipher) [33], [34], [35]. Precise control of the fault injection process, especially in
timing and location, is important to the success of many fault injection attacks. In
addition, multiple device restarts are often required to obtain the sufficient results
in order to determine the device signature. For example, to retrieve the 1024-bit
key of a RSA engine, the total number of device restarts for a successful attack is
approximately 1024× ln(1024) = 3083 [33].
To conduct precisely controlled fault injection attacks, it usually requires an ex-
pensive setup, which includes device-under-test (DUT), fault injection equipment,
input vector generator, fault impact checking and results collection. However, the
difficulty and cost of such attacks can be reduced by taking advantage of disturbed
inner state transitions. For example, to alter the internal states of a circuit with
certain knowledge of the design is not necessarily expensive. One attack proposed
in [41] against SNOW 3G was carried out without the precise control of fault injection
timing and location. Instead, it induced random faults on the inner state registers
and view the output of the cipher as a nonlinear function. After fault injection, the
attacker can deduce the position of faults by comparing faulty outputs with correct
ones, and solve a set of nonlinear equations to retrieve the key.
Usually, it is more effective to apply fault attacks on control flow than data flow.
In [42], fault injection attacks were applied to a RSA cipher targeting the control
logic instead of the algorithm itself. By introducing glitches into the clock signal, the
attacker was able to skip certain instructions and recover all key bits at the same time.
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The work in [2] investigated the effect of injected faults on a microcontroller. Although
the observation was made at outputs, the presence of state transition errors can still
be noticed as some of the output errors can only be explained by the replacement
of certain instructions. These results suggest that some instructions or registers are
more vulnerable to fault attacks than others.
The behavior of injected faults in digital circuits is analogous to soft errors, which
are a well-studied subject with many analytical models available to describe the er-
ror propagation process as well as the statistics of resulted failures under different
scenarios [43], [44]. However, the particular interest of these studies is usually the
propagation of errors to the primary output, whereas the perturbed internal states
during error propagation are often ignored. On the other hand, efforts have been made
on evaluating the potential vulnerability of FSMs. The formal verification methodol-
ogy of sequential logic is essentially a framework based on the state transition model
of digital circuits [45], and to its extension, evaluation methods were proposed with
FSM-based model checking to evaluate circuit error resilience [10], or to quantify the
vulnerability of registers on the control path [46]. Some discussion on the security
risks of FSM models can be seen in [12], [47], [48]. The work in [12] concerns coarsely
grouped “normal” and “protected” states according to the specified state transition
model, which only considers the high-level transition behavior of a logic, not related
to any particular attack scenario or threat model. The method in [47] belongs to
the conventional FSM design framework that employs parity checking to ensure state
transition correctness. The work in [48] proposes an automatic test pattern gener-
ation (ATPG) based tool to extract the state transition graph from the synthesized
netlist. It is able to reveal the logic resilience against fault injection from the “don’t
care” states. Different from these existing work, we will study the impact of injected
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faults on FSMs from hardware security perspective and propose a general evaluation
framework based on probabilistic analysis methods.
2.3 Motivation and Attack Analysis
It has been shown that induced faults can be utilized to target the control logic of
crypto systems, through which new types of side channels are created by skipping cer-
tain operations, and the encryption signature is revealed. Apparently, crypto systems
are not the only victim. The state transitions in digital systems can be compromised
by fault injection attacks in a similar way, which may result in the leak of critical
information or enable unauthorized use. FSM is a generic model of many digital
systems. In particular, circuit design at the RTL level can be easily understood as
FSM, where a state transition represents a set of unique assignments of register values
corresponding to the primary inputs. However, current hierarchical design practice
can create loopholes because system designers usually have only limited knowledge
on circuit implementations at the hardware level.
2.3.1 FSM Properties
The vulnerabilities of an FSM design come from various factors when it is imple-
mented in hardware. First, an FSM can have a small number of states; however, the
total number of states in a digital circuit implementation is 2n, where n is the number
of the registers. Hence, it is possible that extra states are implemented without con-
sidering any security implications. Second, a state transition is normally associated
with only one or few input variables, and the access probability of each state tends
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to be non-uniformly distributed. This may cause certain circuit nodes to have a high
security risk. For instance, as discussed in the following sections, such states endure
a high chance of being attacked during the random access attempt. Third, under
certain design constraints such as performance and timing, EDA tools may automat-
ically optimize a design in order to meet the design criteria. This further weakens the
designer’s controllability during the design process.
To understand how attackers could leverage these design vulnerabilities, we need
to first identify the critical states in an FMS design. Figure 2.1(a) shows an example
of state transition diagram with four states, and the corresponding binary encoded
circuit implementation containing two state registers is depicted in Fig. 2.1(b). It can
be seen that states C and D are reachable from all other states, whereas states A
and B are self-contained. Hence both states A and B are critical, and unauthorized
transition paths (such as the one indicated by the red dash arrow) should be pre-
vented. In practical designs, there are user specified critical states. For example, the
encryption algorithms usually have repetitive computations and a final-round state
that stores the final result into memory. In this case, the final-round state needs to
be protected from unauthorized accesses, because any access to the final-round state
during the iteration process will reveal intermediate computation results, which are
frequently reported to be used to reveal the key. In the following discussion, we refer
to these critical states as protected states and the other states as normal states.
2.3.2 Attack Model
In practice, the vulnerability of modern ICs is originated from device scaling and
nano-technology fabrication. Manufacture flaws, such as doping defects or material
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2.1: An example of FSM and its faulty transition: (a) state transition graph and
(b) logic circuit implementation. The corresponding state transition table is shown in (c).
31
impurity, can be activated by environmental stresses to generate faults or failures in
logic functions. These environmental stresses include over- or under-powered voltage
supply, manipulated clock signals, radioactive or electromagnetic wave injection, etc.
The cost of the equipment to setup fault injection attacks could be cheap or expensive.
For example, manipulating supply power or clock signals is usually low-cost compared
with utilizing electromagnetic waves that target the device-under-attack in a very
precise manner. In this paper, we aim to develop a generic evaluation method for
design vulnerabilities under fault injection attacks. The impact of injected faults at
internal circuit nodes are modeled as error variables (see Section 4.2) to cover various
fault injection mechanisms with different scales and magnitudes.
As shown in Fig. 2.1(b), if an error is introduced at internal node A when both
registers are ‘1’ (state D), the error may propagate to register 1 and flip its output
from ‘1’ to ‘0’. This makes the FSM to switch from state D to state B directly,
generating an unauthorized path on the transition diagram as shown by the dashed
line in Fig. 2.1(a). Thus, the FSM switches from a normal state to a protected state,
which should not be allowed during the normal operation. An attacker may gain
access to the critical states by manipulating environment conditions and inject faults
to achieve this goal.
Exploiting similar vulnerabilities, fault injection attacks can be launched by the
attacker to bypass the security safeguard and bring the system to a protected state.
All of the factors discussed before will affect the probability that a protected state is
maliciously accessed. It has been discussed in the previous section that fault injection
attacks do not necessarily need the precise control of injection process, but instead
target the intrinsic vulnerabilities through randomly induced faults. In such case,
the higher probability a transition to the protected states, the more likely successful
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attacks can be launched. If a state is critical, any malicious accesses to this state
can cause serious consequences, such as denial of service or exposure of important
information.
Although the fault injection process might be random, if the target state is noise
sensitive, these attacks can be quite effective with the assistance of post-attack analy-
sis. On the other hand, if the attacker knows the design, he can intentionally introduce
faults into the circuit; for example, a hardware Trojan can be activated by aging the
circuit nodes that are associated with the unused states, thereby creating a faulty
transition path to the protected state [49]. Designers need to know the vulnerabili-
ties in their design, such as how easily the protected state can be maliciously accessed
and where the most vulnerable path is. In addition, a formal design metric is needed
to quantify the unauthorized state transitions, thereby allowing designers to improve
the resilience of their designs against hardware attacks.
Conventional FSM analysis aims at creating the correct function, e.g., using formal
verification methods to check whether an implementation has the desired function.
These methods usually relay upon a static/deterministic FSM model. However, ran-
domly induced faults will introduce large uncertainties in FSM dynamic transitions.
In this paper, we will develop a statistical basis to identify the potential vulnerabilities
in FSM design. To start with a self-contained problem, it is assumed that attackers
do not necessarily know the design specifications and can provide any input patterns
to the system. Attackers can also change the environmental condition to introduce
faults. The state machine can be initiated from any normal states, and attackers are
able to check if the manipulated state transition is successful. These are some general
assumptions in most FSM models and can be relaxed in practical circuit design.
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2.4 Analysis of Inner State Transitions
In this section, we present the probabilistic model to study the inner transitions
in FSMs for security enhancement. We first develop the model through a formal
mathematical analysis and then discuss the complexity and scalability of this model
in dealing with complex FSMs.
2.4.1 State Transitions
Since our target is unauthorized transitions from normal states to protected states,
the probabilistic model needs to quantify the inner state transitions rather than the
final output of the FSM. To begin with, we define the reachable states of a state u as
the set of states that can be reached from u, denoted as
R (u) = {v ⊆ V | v is reachable from u} . (2.1)
Similarly, each state has a set of states from which it can be reached. This set of
states is called the starting states. The starting state of u is defined as
S (u) = {v ⊆ V | u is reachable from v} . (2.2)
It is easy to see that if a ⊆ R (b) and b ⊆ R (c), then a ⊆ R (c). A safe state
machine must have its reachable state sets and starting state sets to be exactly the
same as specified by the designer; otherwise, there exist unauthorized transition paths
that can be exploited by the adversary. For example, when a system is stressed such
as being exposed to the injected faults, a state may be accessed by the undefined
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transitions caused by register flips. We refer to these transitions as unauthorized
transitions.
We will develop a mathematical model to evaluate how induced faults will affect
inner state transitions. The state transition function δ0 of an FSM is defined as
s (t+ 1) = δ0 [(i (t)) , s (t)] , (2.3)
where δ0 maps the current state s(t) to the next state s(t + 1) by considering the
input i(t). If the dimensions of discrete input space I and state space S are k and
n, respectively, the state transition table will have 2n rows and 2k columns, where
each entry provides the mapping information as defined in (2.3). An example of state
transition table is given in Fig. 2.1(c).
2.4.2 State Transitions under Fault Injection Attacks
FSMs can be designed in various ways with different hardware implementations. The
vulnerability of critical states also varies in these implementations. To quantitatively
assess a state transition, it is necessary to look the implementation of an FSM as
a sequential circuit, as shown in Fig. 2.2. Here we only consider the combinational
logic for state transitions and omit the output logic. The state variables are stored in
the n registers synchronized by a clock signal. We can track the fan-in gates of each
state register. The total number of fan-in gates is G ≤∑ni=1 gi, where gi denotes the
number of fan-in gates of the ith register.
An indicator function Findc is derived from the transition map to show if there is
35
Figure 2.2: A generic model of sequential circuits.
a transition path between any two states si and sj, such as
Findc,ij (δ0 [(i (t)) , si (t)] , sj (t+ 1))
=

1 δ0 [(i (t)) , si (t)] = sj (t+ 1)
0 δ0 [(i (t)) , si (t)] 6= sj (t+ 1)
(2.4)
The probabilistic transition matrix T is a 2n×2n matrix, in which the element Tij
at row i and column j is the probability of one-step transition from state i to state
j. Since δ0 is a function of the input and current state, in a noiseless environment
the transition probability depends on the input probability P (i) and the transitions
when this input appears, i.e.,
Tij =
∑
i∈I
P (i) · Findc,ij. (2.5)
The behavior of the injected errors at internal circuit nodes can be modeled as
an error variable at the gate/register output as depicted in Fig. 2.2. We distinguish
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the errors in combinational gates and state registers with different variables  and γ,
respectively. Note that gate errors may have a smaller chance to flip the state due
to propagation attenuation [50]. To simplify the problem, only single event upsets
(SEU) are considered. Even so, we are able to show the vulnerability of an FSM
design and this approach can be extended to multiple event upsets. It is reasonable
to treat the error variables as an extension of the original vector space. The dimension
of the vector space is enlarged from k + n to k + 2n + G, where k, n and G are the
sizes of input space, state space, and fan-in gates of state registers, respectively. To
show this, the vector space U of the FSM and some related subspaces are defined as
follows.
Subspace I with dimension k defines the input
I = {i ∈ U ; i = (i1, i2, · · · , ik) , ij = 0, 1} . (2.6)
Subspace U1 with dimension G defines error variable  at combinational gates
U1 = { ∈ U ;  = (1, 2, · · · , G) , j = 0, 1} . (2.7)
Similarly, U2 is the subspace of error variable γ at state registers. The dimension
of U2 is n, as
U2 = {γ ∈ U ; γ = (γ1, γ2, · · · , γn, ) , γj = 0, 1} . (2.8)
In combination with the state space S of size n, the complete vector space U that
the FSM is defined upon is given as
U = {I ∪ U1 ∪ U2 ∪ S} . (2.9)
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Hence, the transition function δ0 in the presence of errors can be rewritten as
s (t+ 1) = δ0 [(i (t) , , γ) , s (t)] . (2.10)
A faulty transition occurs when the system in state i at time t fails to go to state
j at t+ 1 as it is supposed to. A faulty transition may create a non-existing path on
the transition map, which can be checked as a new non-zero element in the indicator
matrix. The probability of faulty state transitions is defined as
ζ = P {δ0 [(i (t) , , γ) , s (t)]⊕ δ0 [(i (t) , 0, 0) , s (t)] = 1} . (2.11)
Under the previous assumption, error variables  and γ are independent, each of
which obeys the binomial distribution with a probability of p1 and p2, respectively.
In other words, p1 and p2 are the probabilities of a single gate error and a register
error, respectively. In this model, we assume if a gate error propagates to a register
or an error takes place inside a register, the content of the register will be changed.
A vector A with size of n can be defined, where the ith element Ai indicates the
probability of bit upsets at the ith register, such as
Ai =
∑
∈U1,i
P ()
+ P (γ) , (2.12)
where U1,i is the subspace of the fan-in gates of the i
th register. Therefore, A rep-
resents the likelihood of erroneous register flips, which is an important factor to
determine the faulty state transition probability. Note that the first term on the
right hand side of (2.12) is due to the immediate fan-in gates as well as the error
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propagation effect of other combinational gates. More comprehensive estimate can
be done by weighting error probabilities at different combinational gate stages [44],
but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
The probability of faulty state transition ζij from state i to state j is related
to the Hamming distance between the two states, which can be determined from
H(Si, Sj) = Si ⊕ Sj, as well as the likelihood of corresponding bit flips. We use
function B to denote the probability of faulty transitions. A faulty transition between
two states happens when the Hamming distance between the two states is overcome
by bit errors. Apparently, B is a matrix with dimension of 2n × 2n. Each element
Bij gives the probability of faulty transitions from state i to state j, which can be
calculated as
Bij = P (ζij) =
n∏
k=1
(Si ⊕ Sj)k ◦ Ak, (2.13)
where ◦ stands for Hadamard product.
Example 1 : Assume that state 1 and state 2 are encoded as “1101” and “1011”,
respectively. A faulty transition between the two states occurs when the registers
of middle two bits flip at the same time, which can be represented as [1, 1, 0, 1] ⊕
[1, 0, 1, 1] = [0, 1, 1, 0]. The probabilities of bit errors of these registers are stored in
matrix A. Let’s say A = [1e− 4, 2e− 4, 1e− 3, 1e− 4]. Then the probability of faulty
transitions between these two states can be calculated as
B1,2 =
4∏
k=1
(S1 ⊕ S2)k ◦ Ak
= ((1e− 4)× 0)× ((2e− 4)× 1)× ((1e− 3)× 1)× ((1e− 4)× 0)
= 2e− 7
(2.14)
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Note that (2.13) represents the static state transitions under errors. Now we can
study the dynamic behavior of state transitions under hardware attacks. Dynamic
state transitions need to be refined by considering different access patterns of the
states in an FSM. The one-step transition matrix T , which is defined in (2.5), is
determined not only by the input probability P (i) but also by the error probability
P () and P (γ). A faulty transition could happen if faults propagate to, or occur at
the state registers. Hence, the probability of dynamic faulty transitions from state i
to state j is the sum of probabilities of faulty flips to state j from any states that are
accessible by state i. This can be calculated as the matrix multiplication of T (see
(2.5)) and B
T ′ij = Ti,: · B:,j. (2.15)
Example 2 : Assume that state 4 is a protected state, and we need to calculate
the probability of a faulty transition path from state 1 to state 4. The probability of
legitimate transitions from state 1 to other states are stored in the first row of matrix
T (e.g., [0.75, 0.15, 0.1, 0]). The erroneous flipping probabilities from all other states
to state 4 is stored in the fourth column of matrix B (e.g., [5e−6, 7e−3, 7e−3, 0.99]).
Hence, the probability of the faulty transition path from state 1 to state 4 can be
calculated as
T ′1,4 = T1,: · B:,4
= [0.75, 0.15, 0.1, 0] · [5e− 6, 7e− 3, 7e− 3, 0.99]
= 0.00175
(2.16)
Combining (2.4), (2.5), (2.12), (2.13) and (2.15), we obtain the probabilistic tran-
sition matrix T ′ij with faulty transitions as
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T ′ij =
n∑
1
{
(P (i) · Findc,ij)i,: ·
n∏
r=1
(Si ⊕ Sj)r ·(∑
∈U1,i
P () + P (γ)
)
r

:,j
} (2.17)
2.4.3 Model Complexity, Scalability and Limitations
In the above matrix T ′, each element T ′ij represents the probability of transitions from
state i to state j under fault injection attacks. To determine each entry of this matrix,
the most complex calculation is the multiplication of matrices of size NS×NS with a
complexity of O(NS3) using naive algorithms, where NS ≤ 2n is the total number of
states. Advanced methods such as Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [51] can greatly
reduce this complexity. Potentially, faulty transition paths exist between any two
states, but those paths leading to a normal state do not pose security concerns (though
there may be some function issues). This is because normal states are designed to
be accessible by other states. Attentions should be paid to the paths that enable
malicious accesses to the protected states. Hence, if the total number of protected
states is N ps, then the multiplication complexity is only O(N ps ·NS2). Note that
our work targets the control functions in security operations. Usually, these control
functions are a subset of the entire state machine and contain a limited number of
states. Also, state-of-the-art module-based designs build large state machines from
small modules with manageable sizes in a hierarchical way. For complicated FSMs
extracted from synthesized and flatten netlists, measures can be taken to decompose
them into sub-FSMs, thereby reducing the computational complexity of the proposed
method.
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Figure 2.3: FSM decompostion example: (a) original FSM graph; (b) original next state
transition table; (c) decomposed state machine M1; (d) decomposed state machine M2; (e)
next state transition table of M1; and (f)next state transition table of M2.
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Figure 2.4: The flowchart of searching protected states.
FSM decomposition is a group of methodologies that are effective in dealing with
large state machines. It decomposes a large state machine into smaller sub-machines
while maintains the same functionality, so that the searching space and design com-
plexity can be greatly reduced. Consider an example based on the method proposed
in [52] as shown in Fig. 2.3. Here the original STG with six states (Fig. 2.3(a)) is
transformed into two smaller STGs: sub-state machine M1 (Fig. 2.3(c)) with five
states and sub-state machine M2 (Fig. 2.3(d)) with three states. Two new states
R and S are introduced to M1 and M2 respectively in order to retain the original
functionality. The new states R and S are only for function equivalence and do not
need to be encoded. We know that the matrix B (see (2.13)) will not change for the
original encoding, and hence there are two different situations of computing the faulty
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transition probability after decomposition: (1) the initial state does not directly tran-
sit to state R or S (such as states C,E, F ), and (2) the initial state has a direct path
to state R or S (such as states D,A,B). Assume state D is the protected state in
this design. To take a faulty transition path from state F to D which is an example
of the first situation, we can calculate the probability according to (2.12), (2.13), and
(2.15) based on FSM M1:
T ′F,D = T
M1
F,: · BM1:,D = 0.5(BC,D) + 0(BD,D) + 0.5(BE,D) + 0(BF,D) (2.18)
where TM1F,: is the row of the next state probability for M1, which is [0.5, 0, 0.5, 0],
and BM1:,D is the portion of matrix B with respect to the states in M1.
Similarly, an example of the second situation is shown to calculate the faulty
transition probability from state A to D, and a two-step procedure needs to be taken
as follows:
T ′A,D = T
M2
A,: · BM2:,D = 0(BA,D) + 0(BB,D) + 1(T ′S/A,D) (2.19)
T ′S/A,D = T
M1
R,: · BM1:,D = 0.5(BC,D) + 0(BD,D) + 0(BE,D) + 0.5(BF,D) (2.20)
In this process, an intermediate term T ′S/A,D is calculated based on sub-FSM M1
and then substituted into sub-FSM M2 as the faulty transition probability from state
S to D. The computation is divided into two steps and the complexity is bounded
by the size of the largest sub-FSM. Clearly, by decomposing the original FSM into
smaller sub-FSMs, the complexity of the proposed model is reduced. Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that the proposed method has its limitations. For example, for users
who do not possess the FSM specifications of a design, or in the cases when circuits are
not designed from state transition specifications, existing tools such as FSM complier
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of Xilinx tool set, state machine viewer of Altera QuatusII, or various open-source
tools such as AVFSM as presented in [48] will be needed to extract the FSMs. Also,
in order to manage the computational complexity, FSM decomposition methods need
to be applied in dealing with large FSMs. As discussed before, after decomposing a
large FSM into smaller sub-FSMs, the computational complexity will be contained
by the size of sub-FSMs. Furthermore, decomposition can be applied multiple times
depending on the computation needs.
2.5 Improving FSM Security Through Re-encoding
In the previous section, we modeled the behavior of FSM under random fault injection
attacks. The probability of each faulty transition path, in particular the unauthorized
transitions to the protected states, can be derived from the proposed statistical model.
In order to improve the resilience of an FSM design, the probabilities of these faulty
transitions must be minimized. In this section, we will develop a technique to achieve
this goal.
2.5.1 Identification of Protected States
By searching the indicator function Findc, it is possible to identify all the protected
states as well as the accessibility between any states. In the indicator function, a
value ‘1’ at entry Findc,ij means there is a transition path from state i to state j.
Whether or not a state should be protected is determined by its starting state set.
The searching procedure is shown in Fig. 2.4. It will consist of n loops to search
through the connectivity of all n states in an FSM. In the first loop, the states with
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of faulty transitions. Since state B is more frequently accessed,
the faulty transition probability TBA is higher than TCA.
one-step path (e.g., direct transition path) to a target state are found by checking
the corresponding value in the indicator function. These states will be saved along
with their connection paths in space N (e.g., with direct paths to the target state),
and the rest states are saved in space M . If space N is empty after the first iteration,
meaning there is no direct transition to the target state, the loop will end and the
target state will be protected from all the other states. Otherwise, the loop continues
to move the elements in space M to space N when there is an indirect transition
path from a state in M to any states in N . Hence, the searching during each round
depends on the current size of N . Both spaces will keep updated until either M
becomes an empty space, which means the target state of the current iteration is a
normal state (e.g., all the states can access the target state); or no more transitions
can be found from M to N , which means the target state should be protected from
the states in space M , as there is no direct or indirect transitions from any states in
M to the target state. Either condition will terminate the loop and move on to the
next state. Once searching is done, all states will be classified into the normal states
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and the protected states. Searching results will also show that every protected state
should be protected from all the normal states, which is easy to understand because
a normal state is accessible from other states by definition.
2.5.2 Re-encoding of FSM
In Section 3, we discussed some security vulnerabilities in FSM design. An important
finding is that, since the access possibility of each state is usually non-uniform, some
states may see more risks than the others. To achieve the expected function, not
all transition paths need to be specified. This reflects on the indicator function as
many zero elements. As the size of FSM increases, more transition paths may be left
un-specified.
During the circuit operation, the possibilities of state accesses are also very differ-
ent. There are always some states being accessed more frequently than the others. A
portion of a probabilistic FSM transition graph is shown in Fig. 2.5 as an example. In
this figure, state A is protected from the normal states B and C. In a specific design,
these normal states have different access patterns. For example, it can be seen that
state B is a “hot spot” with many path transitions and a high access probability. In
contrast, the probability of accessing state C is relatively small. This makes state B
a much more vulnerable state, because if maliciously flipped, it has a higher chance
to access the protected state A.
It can be seen from (2.13) that the probability of faulty transitions is a function of
the Hamming distance between two states. A larger Hamming distance means that
more register bits need to be upset to enable a transition. In random faulty injection,
flipping of each register bit is relatively independent, and thus the probability of a
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faulty transition path is effectively the product of the probability of each bit being
maliciously flipped. Since the chance of a register being flipped is usually very small,
with a larger Hamming distance, the probability of a faulty transition path is reduced.
Considering this fact, a decision must be made to keep the Hamming distance as far
as possible from the protected states to those states with high access probabilities.
This will greatly mitigate the chance of malicious accesses to the protected states.
For example, in Fig. 2.5, state B should have a large Hamming distance to state
A in order to avoid faulty transitions from B to A. On the other hand, it might
be acceptable if state C holds a small Hamming distance to state A as state C is
accessed less frequently.
The unused states in an FSM design can be utilized to reduce security risks.
In this paper, we propose a re-encoding algorithm to enhance state assignment and
adjust the Hamming distance to the protected states. The proposed scheme manages
security risks according to the design properties so as to avoid risky faulty paths.
After searching for the protected states as shown in Fig. 2.4, all states will be tagged
as either normal or protected. In addition, designers are also able to customize state
tags according to their functions and security needs. The proposed algorithm consists
of two steps: state re-ordering and state re-encoding. First, a binary vector space
space s is defined to store all the possible encodings of n state variables; therefore
the size of space s is 2n with width n. Then, two other vector spaces, norm s and
protect s, are exported from the searching program to store the normal and protected
states, respectively. The total size of norm s and protect s is equal to or smaller than
the size of space s as there are unused states.
In algorithm 1 (state re-ordering), space s is re-ordered according to the Hamming
distance of each element to the elements in protect s, and the states with larger
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Algorithm 1 State re-ordering
Require: Originally encoded states are stored in space s of size ”n×2n”, where n is
the number of the state variables
Require: Encoding of protected states are saved in space protect s, normal states
are saved in space norm s
procedure state re-ordering
2: norm len← length(norm s);
protect len← length(protect s);
4: top:
if i > 2n or j > protect len then return false
6: end if
loop1 :
8: for i = 1, i++, while i <= 2n
if Hamming(space s(i), protect s(1)) < Hamming(space s(i +
1), protect s(1)) then
10: temp← space s(i).
space s(i)← space s(i+ 1).
12: space s(i+ 1)← temp.
goto loop1.
14: close;
end if
16: loop:
for j = 1, j++, while j < protect len
18: protect s(j)← space s(space len− j + 1)
goto loop.
20: close;
goto top.
22: end procedure
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Algorithm 2 Encoding normal states according to the access frequency
Require: Transition function for all normal states are extracted from transition func-
tion Tij in error-less environment and store in space P
1: procedure State Re-encoding (P )
2: Space← P,
3: Index← Index(norm s).
4: Sum← Sum(Space).
5: R space← Index ∪ Sum. . ∪ here donates concatenation of two spaces
6: SortRow(R space, 2).
7: Output Index;
8: close;
9: end procedure
Hamming distance to the protected states will be brought to the top. Note that if
there are multiple protected states, the designer could re-order the space s according
to the priorities of these protected states. Also, we are not concerned too much about
the transitions between two protected states, as it is more important to prevent the
malicious access into these states from the outside. In other words, it is suitable to
encode all protected states in a bundle that is difficult for all the normal states to
access. Hence, the elements in space s are only compared with the top elements in
protect s during re-ordering. After that, other protected states will be re-encoded by
the states with the smallest Hamming distance to the first protected state. By doing
so, the overall Hamming distance from the protected states to the normal states is
maximized.
The re-encoding of normal states is summarized in algorithm 2. First, all the
normal states need to be re-ranked according to their access probabilities. The access
probability of each state can be derived from the transition function T ij as defined
in (2.5), where the total probability for a state to be accessed is the sum of the
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of the average faulty transition probability.
corresponding column. By doing so, we acquire an updated state index where a
smaller index number indicates a more frequently accessed state. According to this
index, the normal states can be re-assigned by the re-ordered state space from space s.
For example, if state 5 is the most frequently accessed normal state, then it is indexed
by 1. Meanwhile, the space s is re-ordered according to the Hamming distance to the
protected state 15, coded as “1111”. Hence, state 5 will be re-assigned to code “0000”,
as this is the first state found in the re-ordered space s. After state re-assignment,
it will ensure that normal states are moved further away in Hamming distance from
the protected states. This reduces the risk of faulty transitions caused by hardware
attacks.
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of the worst-case faulty transition probability.
2.6 Simulation and evaluation
In this section, FSM benchmarks from LGsynth91 [53] will be evaluated using the
proposed work. We built the probabilistic transition model for each benchmark and
calculated the faulty transition rates to the protected states using the method devel-
oped in this paper. Quantitative results were derived for measuring the design risks
in a fault injection scenario. We also applied the re-encoding algorithm to mitigate
the design risks, and the new designs were re-evaluated to show the improvement.
The probabilistic transition matrices of the benchmarks were derived and evaluated
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through simulations. The synthesis information of the circuit implementations with
different encoding schemes was obtained in the Synopsys EDA environment.
2.6.1 Benchmark Simulation
It is worth mentioning that in most of the LGsynth91 benchmarks, states are de-
signed to be accessible from each other due to design simplicity. To evaluate fault
injection attacks, we remove some paths from the original designs to create the fea-
ture of protected states. The removed paths need to be carefully selected in order to
keep the modified design still reflect the properties of the original design. For this
consideration, an algorithm was applied to the derived transition matrix to find the
least likely visited state, and the transition paths to this state were removed. For
the purpose of illustration, we only create one protected state in each benchmark.
Eight different benchmarks were simulated, and the information of these benchmarks
is listed in Table 2.1.
We define error variables  and γ to represent the errors at combinational logic
and registers, respectively. The probability of errors at each circuit node obeys a
binomial distribution with a probability w. To consider the attenuation of errors in
combinational logic, a variable α is applied to the probability of  so that  = α · w.
Here 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, which indicates the probability of error propagation from the fault
site to the register input [54]. For the purpose of illustration, the value of α is assumed
to be 0.5 in our simulation. On the other hand, γ is equal to w as there is no error
propagation effect in register errors (e.g., the input to a FSM). For each benchmark,
the average faulty transition rate from all the normal states to the protected state
is determined using the proposed model in Section 3, as shown in Fig. 5. In these
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Benchmark No .of states No. of inputs
No. of
transitions
No. of
removed
edges
No. of re-
moved
transitions
bbtas 6 2 24 2 4
dk14 7 3 56 1 1
beecount 7 3 28 2 2
bbara 10 4 60 2 12
train11 11 2 25 2 2
dk512 15 1 30 0 0
ex2 19 2 72 1 1
dk16 27 2 108 1 1
Table 2.1: Benchmark information
Benchmark
Comb
Area (µm2)
Non-Comb
Area (µm2)
Total Area (µm2)
Area Overhead (%)
Orig Modi Orig Modi Orig Modi
bbtas 93 108 44 44 137 152 10.86
dk14 430 449 44 44 474 493 4.04
beecount 318 346 44 44 362 390 7.74
bbara 301 298 58 58 359 357 -0.72
train11 343 344 58 58 401 402 0.27
dk512 261 273 58 58 319 331 3.76
ex2 1187 1180 73 73 1260 1253 -0.51
dk16 998 1114 73 73 1071 1187 10.84
Table 2.2: Area overhead of original vs. modified encoding schemes.
simulations, the value of w was chosen to be 5e − 3 [55]. We also provide other
evaluation results to compare the worst-case faulty transition path under different
error rates. Clearly, after the re-encoding technique is applied, both the average
faulty transition rate and the transition rate of the worst faulty path (i.e., the most
vulnerable path) have been significantly reduced.
Since FSM circuits are often designed with non-uniformly distributed transition
paths, there always exist some paths that have high transition probabilities. Iden-
tifying these paths is critical at the design phase, as they are more likely to allow
the adversary to gain the access to the protected states. To study this problem, we
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evaluated the worst-case scenario of each benchmark when error rate w varies from
1e− 5 to 5e− 2. The results are shown in Fig. 2.7, in which the dash lines represent
the transition probability of the most vulnerable path in the original designs, and
the solid lines show the improved transition probability in the modified FSM using
the proposed re-encoding technique. First of all, we can see that the probability of
faulty transitions increases linearly with the induced errors, which is consistent with
the empirical observation. Second, by re-ordering the states according to their Ham-
ming distance to the protected state, the overall faulty transition rate is reduced.
This demonstrates that the proposed technique is more robust against fault injection
attacks. As shown, the transition probabilities of the most vulnerable paths can be
very high in some situations. For example, benchmark bbara has a worst-case faulty
transition rate as high as 18%. This value can be reduced almost by half after ap-
plying the proposed re-encoding technique. Actually, the risk of the most vulnerable
path is reduced by more than 50% in most benchmarks, indicating that the resilience
of the FSM circuits against faulty transitions is improved.
From the results above, we can also see that for some cases the improvement is not
so obvious. This is largely due to the fact that the qualities of the original FMS designs
are quite different. In general, the effectiveness of state re-encoding increases as the
complexity of a design goes higher and the design itself becomes more complicated.
This is because a larger input space means a huge number of possible input patterns.
Hence it is difficult for the designer to assign transition paths for all these inputs.
The resulting design will be incomplete and non-uniformly distributed. On the other
hand, as the size of state space goes up, there will be more unspecified states in the
circuit. The more incomplete and non-uniform a design is, the more vulnerable it
could be to the induced faults. Therefore, the state re-encoding technique tends to
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be more effective for a large FSM design.
To evaluate the hardware overhead of the proposed technique, the benchmarks
were implemented using Verilog language in the Synopsys EDA environment with a
65nm CMOS technology. Table 2.2 compares the areas of these designs in the original
linear encoding scheme and the modified implementations. For all the benchmarks
being studied, the area overhead due to re-encoding is no more than 10%. It is
worth mentioning that state re-encoding does not necessarily introduce area overhead
as apposed to conventional security enhancement schemes where either redundant
logic [47] or additional functional blocks [18] will be needed. Actually, area reduction
can be seen in some cases. This is because the original encoding scheme is the standard
linear binary encoding, which is not intended for area optimization. The proposed re-
encoding technique aims to mitigate the security risks from state transitions without
increasing the number of state registers. The area change is mainly due to different
placement and routing of combinational logic implementations. Further improvement
can be achieved if redundant registers are allowed. For example, in Section 4.2 we
calculated the faulty transition probability between state [1,1,0,1] and [1,0,1,1] in
Example 1. If one additional bit is allowed for state encoding, these two states
could potentially be encoded as [1,1,0,1,0] and [1,0,1,1,1], respectively. As a result,
the Hamming distance between the two codewords is increased by one. The faulty
transition probability B1,2 will be reduced to 2e−10 in this case. In the extreme case
that expands the coding space to the maximum, the Hamming distances between any
two states are all equal to 2n − 1. This is also known as the “one hot” encoding,
where the Hamming distances between all states are maximized regardless of their
transition characteristics. While the probabilities of all faulty transitions (including
those to normal states) would be reduced, the hardware overhead is also significant.
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Figure 2.8: Pipeline control flow FSM of a 3-stage pipelined RISC processor.
2.6.2 A Case Study
We will demonstrate the application of the proposed technique through an open source
IP. In practice, the FSM model of an IP implementation could be extracted from its
netlist using tools such as in [48]. We studied the control specification of a RISC
xr16 CPU core and extracted the FSM of its pipeline control path. The RISC xr16
CPU core is a simple 16-bit reduced instruction set processor, which is optimized for
an efficient pipeline implementation. It features a classic 3-stage pipeline (IF, DC,
EX) of 16-bit instructions, byte addressable memory (load/store), integrated direct
memory access (DMA) engine, fast interrupt handling and ∼1.4 cycles per instruction
in a zero wait-state memory system.
The pipeline control logic of RISC xr16 is extracted as an FSM model shown in
Fig. 2.8 based on the implementation in [56]. The pipeline control interacts with
memory controller, datapath, decoder, registers and operand selectors. The regular
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Figure 2.9: RISC x16 pipeline control flow FSM model: (top) faulty transition
probability comparison on the worst case and (bottom) on average.
pipeline is scheduled in the state IF until it has been interrupted by DMA, load/store
(LS), interrupt (INT) or Jump and branch requests. In the RISC architecture, the
control and status registers (CSRs) are used to divide the system privilege. The
privilege of the current application is marked by one bit of the CSRs which is only
flipped through interrupts. Since the interrupt handler always runs at the kernel
mode, the privilege bit is set whenever an interrupt is handled, and then set back
to user-mode when executing the iret instruction. Therefore, maliciously transition
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paths to state DCINT (int in DC stage) need to be protected in order to prevent
unauthorized kernel accesses.
Since the transition pattern of a processor is program dependent, we took a typical
condition with 36% Load instructions, 19% Store instructions, 15% DMA, 7% Branch,
2% Jump, 1% Interrupt, and 20% others, and then calculated the probability of faulty
transitions to the state DCINT. We also calculated the average probability and the
worst case of a regular binary state encoding and the proposed re-encoding scheme.
The results are shown in Fig. 2.9 for comparison with fault injection rates from 5.0e-4
to 5.0e-2. It can be seen that 50%–85% reduction in faulty transitions can be achieved
by the proposed technique.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the design vulnerabilities and potential security risks in
conventional digital circuits subject to randomly injected or induced errors. The
FSM-based stochastic model was developed to evaluate the probabilistic behavior
of FSM transitions under hardware attacks. Although the problem of faulty tran-
sitions is not entirely eliminated but mitigated in the proposed re-encoding scheme,
compared to the conventional hardware-based fault-tolerant design techniques, the
proposed method avoids the duplication/redundancy in the circuit design, thereby
leading to much smaller hardware overheads. Note that in this paper we only consid-
ered one protected state in each design so that the proposed idea can be presented in
a simple but clear way. With a natural extension the proposed technique can cover
multiple protected states. The proposed technique is best-suited for light-weight or
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resource-constraint applications such as Internet of Things. Future work will focus on
reducing the complexity of this technique by exploring efficient FSM characterization
techniques that avoid explicit state enumeration of a given circuit.
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Chapter 3
Design for Test and Hardware
Security Utilizing Retention Loss
of Memristors
3.1 Introduction
Modern IC design requires structural testing as chip fabrication may introduce defects.
Scan chain test is the most commonly employed design-for-testability (DFT) scheme
to increase the observability and controllability of the device-under-test (DUT). This
scheme allows the tester to access the internal nodes of DUT to detect any manufac-
turing related defects. Unfortunately, a scan-based testing structure, when exploited
by malicious parties, can make the circuit susceptible to different types of attacks
and information leakages. Reports have shown that scan chains are widely used by
malicious parties to retrieve the important information of IC chips. In fact, scan
chains allow attackers to retrieve more comprehensive and accurate information of
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chip internal structures than any other side-channel attacks can, and thus put IC
chips in serious security threat.
Common cryptographic systems, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
and Data Encryption Standard (DES), have been hacked by scan-based attacks [57], [58],
[3], [5]. In [3], scan chains were utilized to retrieve the key of the DES algorithm.
Because of the iterative computation of DES, different parts of the user key is carried
by each round of key generation. If attackers can switch scan chains between the nor-
mal and test modes, by putting carefully prepared plaintext contents (i.e., plaintexts
with only one bit difference) into the DES circuit, they are able to determine the
user key from scan outputs during the internal rounds. Similarly, scan-based attacks
can be carried out against AES ciphers as well [5]. It takes advantage of the basic
differential properties of AES as a block cipher, where if a pair of plaintext inputs are
only one bit different in the least significant bit of any byte, the possibility of output
difference of first round is restricted. Moreover, only a few of these output pairs can
be generated by a unique pair of S-box inputs. Hence, attackers can switch between
the test and normal modes of scan chains in order to observe the first round response
for input pairs with designated differences. The overall computational complexity for
retrieving the user key is greatly reduced with the acquired internal state informa-
tion. Furthermore, the need of switching between the scan and test modes can also
be avoided once attackers figure out the mapping between the input bit to the scan
cell [4].
Many secure scan chain designs have been proposed to restrict the access of unau-
thorized users or to confuse the scan response of the device [59], [60], [61]. However,
these schemes are subject to several limitations such as deficient scan protection, com-
plex architecture design, or compromise of chip testability. Previously, we proposed a
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secure scan chain obfuscation design utilizing the inherent performance degradation
of memristor cells [18]. The scan chain output is multiplied with a built-in mem-
ristor array before it is received by the tester. The authorized tester allows regular
refreshes of the memristor content; otherwise, the scan output is obfuscated by the
natural degradation of memristor devices. Without losing any test capability of the
original scan chain architecture, the proposed scheme can provide configurable and
truly randomized confusion to the scan response with minor complexity. In this pa-
per, we extend our past work with the following contributions. First, we propose
a new design that achieves scan obfuscation on analog-based memristor devices and
develop an analytical scheme to recover scan responses. Second, we improve obfus-
cation performance by developing statistical models as a guidance for determining
the key design parameters, such as memristor refresh frequency. Third, circuit im-
plementations are presented showing the memristor-based obfuscation method with
very low hardware overhead and little timing and power constraints. Furthermore,
the proposed approach can be easily adopted by the existing scan chain structures
without the need of re-designs or modifications.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review
the characteristics and existing countermeasures for scan-based attacks. Memristor
devices and their retention loss is studied in Section III. The proposed secure scan
chain technique is presented in Section IV and reliable scan data recovery scheme
is discussed in Section V. Details about the circuit implementation are discussed in
Section VI. Section VII presents the simulation results and performance evaluation in
terms of hardware cost, timing and power consumption as well as security enhance-
ment.
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3.2 Countermeasures for Scan-based Attacks
Scan-based attacks exploit the leakage of intermediate computations in iterative ci-
phers to reduce the complexity of key extraction. These attacks are usually per-
formed under the following conditions: (1) the attacker has access to the scan chain,
and can even switch between the normal and scan modes as needed, but the struc-
ture of the scan chain is unknown; (2) the key and round-keys are stored in the
secure RAM/ROM; and (3) the cryptographic circuits under attack are known to the
attacker since these are public information. The procedure usually consists of two
phases: analysis in hardware on the actual circuits and analysis in software, along
with additional steps for deriving the internal hardware and testing structure. As a
result, hundreds of well-selected scan vectors are needed to complete the attack, which
can translate to tens of thousands or more test cycles depending on the DUTs [57], [3].
Existing countermeasures to scan-based attacks either rely on restricting the access
to the scan functionality only to the legitimate users [59], [60], or obfuscating scan
data so that the unauthorized parities cannot interpret [62], [63]. In the industry, a
common practice is to physically disconnect the scan chain after manufacture testing
by burning the anti-fuses. Although this method is easy to implement, the drawback
is also obvious, since no follow-up testing will be possible once the chips are sold to
the market. In [60], a locking mechanism is proposed such that only the users with
the matched key can have access to the scan infrastructure; otherwise both scan input
and output accesses will be gated by a test wrapper. The design complexity of this
method depends on the key length. A higher security level introduces large overhead.
To obfuscate the scan response in a way that only the authorized tester can inter-
pret, simple scan chain modifications are suggested to randomly insert inverter or add
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XORs between scan flip-flops in order to confuse an unauthorized tester [62]. How-
ever, these methods are ineffective against differential scan attacks [64]. The similar
problem exists among the security enhancement provided by the advanced testing
techniques, such as scan compaction [65]. In addition, some techniques relying on the
structural modifications of scan chains are proposed to prevent unauthorized users
from accessing the test data. For example, in [59], [61], scan chain scrambling schemes
are designed to obfuscate scan output sequences from unauthorized testers. To do
so, the scan chain is split into small segments connected to a scrambling logic such
as a random number generator (RNG) or a linear feedback shift register (LFSR).
The scan output is in a predictable order only when a correct test key is received;
otherwise the scan chain will work in a randomly ordered manner. The problem of
these designs is that they require significant scan chain modifications or complicated
locking mechanisms, which can lead to large logic and routing overheads. Also, the
security of the design depends on its complexity. For example, a report shows that the
scrambling techniques may still leak the data dependency on the secret key through
the parity information [66]. In addition, the data would not be scrambled within the
same sub-scan chain. The requirement of re-designing the scan structure also limits
the compatibility of these techniques on various test interfaces, protocols, and de-
signs with third-party IPs. Attempt has been made to encrypt the scan output with
additional encryption blocks [63], but on the other hand, it raises new problems of
testing the corresponding scan data encryption circuit. Also, design complexity and
hardware overhead make such techniques unsuitable for resource-constrained devices
such as Internet-of-Things (IoT).
In this work, we propose a memristor-based secure scan technique suitable for
resource-constrained implementations. By exploiting the intrinsic retention loss of
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memristor devices, the scan data can be obfuscated with true randomness. Further-
more, since memristor devices feature some unique properties such as high density,
high speed and low power consumption, light-weight scan wrappers can be imple-
mented. Compared to the existing approaches, memristor devices in our design op-
erate in the analog mode, which further reduces the hardware overhead.
3.3 memristor devices and drifting effect
3.3.1 Memristor devices
Memristors have gained significant attention in recent years as one of the promising
devices for future hardware design. With the nonvolatile nature, memristors also fea-
ture good properties such as high density, fast operating speed, multiple stable states,
and low power consumption. Memristor devices can be employed in digital or analog
circuits, such as neuromorphic computing networks and multi-state memory cells.
The fabrication of memristor devices can be done in different ways, each resulting in
some unique characteristics. The most common structure is Metal-Insulator-Metal
(MIM) bipolar devices, where metal on both ends are used as electrodes, and the state
of the cell is determined by the growth of a conductive filament inside the insulator
material. Take Titanium oxide memristor (Pt/T iO2/Pt) as an example. When a
positive bias voltage is applied, electron ionization occurs near the anode area and
turns Ti4+ into Ti3+. Positively charged Ti3+ starts to react with free O2− and gen-
erates Ti2O3, which accumulates around the cathode and hence forms a conductive
nanowire growing toward the anode [26]. The conductance of the cell is determined
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by the length of the filament and its geometric dimensions, such that:
Gmem =
1
Rmem
=
A
ρ1l + ρ2(d− l) , (3.1)
where A and d are the cross section area and the total length of the cell, respectively,
l is the length of the filament, and ρ1 and ρ2 are the resistivity of high-conductive
filament and high-resistive TiO2, respectively.
The growth of conductive filaments is sensitive to many factors such as device
dimensions, applied voltage and operation temperature. Another commonly reported
problem is process variations. When a memristor cell is fabricated, there are tough
issues such as line edge roughness (LER) and thickness fluctuations (TF). As a re-
sult, the response of a memristor cell can vary slightly under the same operation
condition. The switching mechanism of resistive memristor devices has been well-
understood, analytical models were developed for typical MIM devices with a resis-
tive material layer, such as TiO2, TaOx and ZnO, under the influence of process
variations [67], [68]. Studies have shown that due to process variations, conductivity
with a quasi-Gaussian distribution [30], [29] was observed when the same writing op-
eration was applied to a memristor array. This leads to uncertainties and randomness
in memory states. However, it makes various memristors suitable for introducing ran-
domness for security purpose, such as being utilized as true random number generator
(TRNG) [15], physical unclonable function (PUF) [16], and scan security enhance-
ment discussed in this paper.
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3.3.2 Drifting effect
Another significant effect of the uncertainties during state switching is that memristor
devices endure retention loss because read is destructive [69]. In other words, the
read operation will cause state drifting in memristor cells. Similar to other resistive
memory devices, the write and read operations of memristor devices are accomplished
by applying bias voltages. As discussed before, bias voltages facilitate the chemical
reactions in a cell, and hence change the state of the cell in the form of increasing
or decreasing the conductive filament length. Normally, a high voltage pulse with a
long duration is used to write the memristor cell. On the other hand, when reading
the memristor cell, a small voltage pulse is applied in order not to perturb its current
state. However, experiments have shown [70] that small state drifting can still occur
when a small bias voltage is applied. This may alter the memory state eventually.
In order to prevent memory states from being perturbed during the read operation,
some works [69] utilized a zero-net-flux read pattern as shown in Fig. 3.1. The read
pattern is composed of positive and negative pulses with equal width so that it brings
the memristor back to its original state after each read operation. However, since the
pulse generation process also bears a certain tolerance level, the uneven positive and
negative pulses can still cause shifting on memristor states. For example, assuming
there are variations on the generated pulse width as in Fig. 3.1, when the initial
state of a cell is logic zero, an excessive flux injection ∆φ due to the difference ∆T
between pulse widths Tn and Tp will gradually shift the state of the cell and may
eventually flip the bit. The similar problem could happen to memristors with logic
one as well [70]. Therefore, the width of reading pulses must be carefully controlled
to ensure the internal state in the safe margin.
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Figure 3.1: The drifting effect of memristor read process.
The flux injection required to change the memristor state from w0 to w is expressed
as [69]:
∆φ =
φD
Roff
2
{
(R(w0))
2 − (R(w))2} , (3.2)
where φD is the amount of the flux to switch on or off of a cell, and Roff is the
resistance of a cell when it is at the off state. As the number of cell accesses increases,
more unbalanced flux injections would occur, which bring the state of the cell to
an uncertain state. In addition, process variations also cause cells to respond to
the injected flux in a less predictable way. Therefore, in memristor-based memory
circuits, regular refreshes or some limitations on read access are required to maintain
cell stability. In general, the retention loss process shares a lot of similarity with the
memory loss of biological systems. It can be described as a stretched-exponential
function [71], also known as the Kohlrausch’s law given below:
ω(t) = ω0 · exp
[−(t/τ)β] , (3.3)
where τ is the characteristic relaxation time and β is the stretch parameter ranging
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Figure 3.2: The proposed secure scan chain scheme.
between 0 and 1. In memristor circuits, time t can be interpreted as the increment
of clock cycles.
3.4 Memristor-based Scan Security Enhancement
Exploiting the properties of memristor devices, we propose a new scan chain scheme
to address scan attacks and enhance the security of testing. The basic idea is to
store a matrix only known to the legitimate tester in a memristor array and use it to
modulate scan outputs. Due to process variations and destructive reads, memristor
cells lose their values and thus randomize the scan response. A configurable refresh
scheme is designed that is only accessible by the authorized test engineers in order
to obtain the uncontaminated scan data. For unauthorized parties, the received
scan output is not only altered by an unknown matrix but also contaminated by the
random retention loss, thereby achieving thorough scan obfuscation. The proposed
scheme does not introduce much complexity as the memristor crossbar structure is a
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natural fit for such task. Furthermore, it can operate with little power and timing
overhead when compared to the regular testing process.
3.4.1 Overall architecture
The proposed secure scan readout architecture is shown in Fig. 3.2. A n×k memristor
array is implemented for the obfuscation purpose. A key comparator allows autho-
rized users with the test key to enable the memory refresh mechanism. The refresh
controller reloads the memristor array with the preset values regularly so that the au-
thorized tester is able to receive the correct test response. For the unauthorized user,
refresh is disabled due to the absence of the key, and after a certain period the testing
output will become erroneous due to memristor retention loss. Matrix multiplication
is a costly operation in digital circuits; however, it can be efficiently implemented in
the memristor crossbar structure as illustrated in Fig 3.3 [26], [72]. Since the binary
scan response vector S can act as the switch for reading each row, the output vector
Y is effectively the multiplication of S and the conductance of memristor cells at the
present state. Therefore the size of the array depends on the buffered size n of scan
outputs. It is worth noting that the sneak-path problem of the crossbar memristor
array can be coped with using diffusive type devices [73], and transistor/diode gated
solutions [74]. Initially a binary matrix Φ should be stored in the array as the base of
computation. Overall, this architecture can provide a double-layer protection. First,
the scan output is obfuscated by multiplying with the matrix Φ. Second, even if
the attacker figures out the content of Φ, without the key he cannot acquire enough
correct scan outputs to effectively launch scan chain attacks.
Initially, we can expect the same conductance for memristor cells with the same
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value (“0” or “1”) once the memristor array is refreshed to the matrix Φ. Then,
memristor cells begin to loss their values as soon as the multiplication starts. There-
fore, the multiplication implemented on the memristor array should be considered
as a non-ideal analog process. Testing process requires high reliability and accuracy.
Thus the memristor array needs to be regularly refreshed to avoid testing errors. The
critical issue in this design is to ensure a reliable recovery of digital scan response
S, and based on that, to determine the frequency of reloading the matrix Φ to the
memristor array.
3.4.2 Scan obfuscation
As discussed above, by implementing matrix multiplications in the crossbar memristor
array, scan outputs can be obfuscated through a simple mechanism. As depicted in
Fig 3.3, the chip scan response S is shifted out and stored in a register with the size
of n. By multiplying this vector with the n × k matrix Φ stored in the memristor
array, vector Y of size k will obtained, i.e.,
Y = Φ× S. (3.4)
As long as the matrix Φ has full rank, based on the linear system theories [75], if
n = k, S can be easily recovered from Y by
S = Φ−1 × Y. (3.5)
Or if n < k, S also has unique solution by solving the linear equations if both
Y and Φ are given. The number of columns k needs to be equal to or larger than
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n to ensure reliable recovery of the scan response S from the received output Y (see
Section V).
Figure 3.3: Matrix multiplications implemented on a memristor crossbar array.
Note that to complete (3.4), read operations are performed on every memristor
cell, which will perturb the preset memory states. Due to process variations and
drifting effects discussed before, random state shifting will occur in the memristor
array. In our previous work [18], we have discussed the feasibility of using a digitalized
memristor array for scan obfuscation. After certain clock cycles, the accumulated
effect will cause bit flips, which introduce errors in the memristor array and make
the scan response S unrecoverable. The introduced errors in the digitalized array
follow a Bernoulli distribution [18]. Simulation has shown that once errors start to
occur, the correlation between the original and obfuscated scan outputs will drop
and eventually approach zero, which indicates a good data obfuscation. However,
the disadvantage of this design is the need of comparator circuits at each memristor
cell, which introduces large hardware overhead. To address this issue, the obfuscation
73
design in this paper is based on the analog memristor array where comparator circuits
are not needed. The scan response vector S is multiplied with the memristor cells
having continuously changing resistance/conductance values. This can be expressed
by adopting the conductance matrix G, of which each element corresponds to the
conductance of a cell in the memristor array. The initial state of G is determined by
the binary matrix Φ as:
Gij = {Gon if Φij = 1 or Goff if Φij = 0} , (3.6)
and the received scan response Y will become:
Y = G× S. (3.7)
The random memory shifting at each read cycle can be modeled as an error matrix
Θ with the same dimension as G. After m read cycles, the conductance matrix G
will be contaminated to Ĝ, which can be expressed as:
Ĝij = Gij +
m∑
k=1
Θkij. (3.8)
Also, the conductance of a memristor cell is bounded by the conductance of the
on and off states, Gon and Goff , respectively, as below:
Ĝij =

Gon if Ĝij ≥ Gon
Gij +
∑m
k=1 Θ
k
ij, others
Goff if Ĝij ≤ Goff
(3.9)
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Reports have shown that due to manufacturing and environmental variations, such
as variations on dimensions, temperature and time of measurement, the conductivity
changes of memristor devices under the same given switching condition demonstrate
a quasi-Gaussian distribution [30]. The mismatches of the positive and negative read
pulses also have a normal distribution. Thus, the errors at each read cycle can be
considered as independent Gaussian noise as below:
f(Θij) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
−Θ2ij
2σ2
, (3.10)
where the variance σ2 can be determined during manufacture testing. Figure 3.4
shows the simulated memristor degradation process as discussed above. It is the
visualization of a 32×32 memristor array before (left figure) and after (right figure)
being read for 1000 cycles. The on and off states are normalized as “1” (white blocks)
and “0” (black blocks), respectively. Due to the repeated read operations, shifting-
induced errors occur and result in intermediate conductance values in the right figure
(gray blocks). Here we choose the variance of errors σ2 to be 1e-3 for the purpose of
illustration. Due to the retention loss, the scan output becomes
Ŷ = Ĝ× S. (3.11)
With the repeated read operations, Y and Ŷ will be less and less correlated,
which means the received scan output will become more and more erroneous over
time. Eventually one would not be able to recover the scan vector S from Ŷ even
with the knowledge of the matrix Φ.
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Figure 3.4: Visualized retention loss of a 32× 32 memristor array.
3.4.3 Security, endurance and reliability
The security of the proposed architecture is ensured by two mechanisms. First, the
matrix content Φ is used to obfuscate the scan output data. This is similar to the
classic Hill cipher [76], which utilizes linear transformations on the message space by
multiplying the message vector with a key matrix to achieve the encryption goal. As
linear transformations are vulnerable to the known plaintext attack, we can restrict
the multiplication function to taking place only after the scan chain captures the
circuit response. Second, the degradation of the memristor array introduces random
scan data obfuscation, and ensures the security even if the matrix Φ is leaked. Since
read operations induce state drifting in memristors, as long as the refresh is not
enabled, the memristor array will lose its values in an unpredictable way.
As discussed before, the scan based attacks need to collect a large amount of test
data to succeed. Memristor degradation will contaminate the scan output far before
that. On the other hand, testing reliability needs to be ensured during an authorized
test. The endurance of memristor devices can support this requirement. In general,
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the resistive memristor devices can endure 109 write cycles [68], which means if the
memristor content is refreshed every 1000 clock cycles as discussed in the proposed
design, a total of 1012 test cycles can be supported. Since the memory refresh rate
needs to be determined to ensure reliable testing, we develop an analytical scheme
to model the scan obfuscation process. This scheme can be used to determine the
memory refresh frequency as well as to recover the scan data reliably. The details of
reliable scan data recovery will be discussed in the next section.
3.5 Scan recovery
With regular memory refreshes, authorized test engineers are able to access the scan
chains. However, the conductance of memory cells is sensitive to read operations, and
scan outputs can be tainted in a very short time. Since testing requires a high relia-
bility, the critical requirement is to ensure that scan vectors can always be obtained
correctly. Thus, the memory refresh frequency must be carefully determined. In this
paper, we utilize the Linear Mean Square Estimator (LMSE) to recover the vector
S in the presence of memristor non-idealities. The benefit of this method is that we
can quantitatively find the confidence level of such estimate to determine the refresh
frequency.
The mathematical formula of LMSE is described in [77]. The specific problem in
this paper can be considered as the scan response S going through a linear system Φ
with noise Θ. Hence, the vector Ŷ is the system output with k observations. In this
case, the LMSE S˜ of the original scan response can be expressed as:
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S˜ = (GTG)−1GT Ŷ , (3.12)
where G is the expected conductivity matrix of the memristor array determined by
the pre-defined matrix Φ. Note that G needs to be a full-rank matrix. The vector Ŷ
is the collected current value at the output, which will be digitized by ADCs. In this
way, analog computation is fulfilled in a digital environment simply by utilizing the
digital scan vector S as the enabling signals for the memristor read operations. One
way to improve the estimation quality is to increase the number of observations k. We
define the size ratio between the column and the row of Φ as r = k
n
. The higher the
ratio r, the more accurate the estimator becomes. As for the test engineers, two steps
are needed once the vector Ŷ is received: (i) to find the S˜ using LMSE according to
(3.12), and (ii) to derive the scan response S from its estimator S˜.
Since the scan response is a binary sequence, test engineers can recover Si based
on its estimator S˜i as below:
S ′i =

1 if S˜i > 0.5,
0 if S˜i ≤ 0.5.
(3.13)
where S ′ is the recovered scan vector. Since S ′ is derived from the estimator S˜, it is
important to understand the quality of this estimate in order to ensure reliable testing.
It is known that the confidence level of the estimator S˜ can be quantified using the
covariance matrix as (GTG)−1σ˜2 [78]. This gives the estimate of the variance of each
S˜i as [78],
var(S˜i) = τ
2
i σ˜
2, (3.14)
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where τ 2i is the i
th element on the diagonal of square matrix (GTG)−1. The estimator
of the variance of the accumulated errors from previous cycles is denoted as σ˜2.
As discussed before, σ2 is the variance of error matrix Θ, which is added to the
conductance matrix G at every read cycle. Hence, the received errors after the array
multiplication can be written as:
Θ̂ = Θ× S. (3.15)
The estimator of its variance, for κ clock cycles, can be expressed as:
σ˜2 = ST × κ · σ2 × S. (3.16)
The confidence interval for each estimator S˜i can be obtained as:
S ′i ∈ [S˜i − c ·
√
var(S˜i), S˜i + c ·
√
var(S˜i)], (3.17)
where c is a constant chosen by the confidence level. For example, a 95% confidence
level (c = 1.96) means 95% of the chance that the actual value of Si will fall into this
interval [79]. Since testing requires high accuracy, c needs to be chosen for a high
confidence level. As we can see, the range of the confidence is not only determined
by the confidence level but also depends on the variance of each estimator S˜i. The
distribution of the estimators and their confidence intervals can be illustrated in
Fig. 3.5. With an appropriate refresh frequency, we can expect errors to be small and
the estimated values not far off from “0” or “1”. As a result, the recovery scheme in
(3.13) is reliable. The confidence interval, represented by the dashed circles, can have
different radius for each estimator S˜i. Typically, the higher the noise, the larger the
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the estimator S˜ and its confidence intervals.
confidence interval becomes (due to high variance). Considering the recovery scheme
utilized in (3.13), when the confidence interval is too large, there are chances that
the original “0” is interpreted as “1” or vice versa. Hence, in order to ensure reliable
scan data recovery, confidence intervals of all estimators should be bounded to not
exceeding 0.5. This is a relatively loose bound showing when the LMSE recovered scan
vector starts to be erroneous and memory refresh becomes necessary. Therefore, it
helps us to establish a statistical model that determines the memory refresh frequency
at the early design stage.
3.6 Circuit Implementation
A detailed implementation of the memristor array is depicted in Fig. 3.6. As shown,
the multiplication operation in (3.11) is realized with a n × k memristor array. The
scan vector S, which is a binary sequence, is used to enable the read pulse generator
of the corresponding row. The circuit of the pulse generator is shown in Fig. 3.6(c).
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Figure 3.6: Overall architecture of the proposed secure scan chain scheme.
When P sel line is high, a positive voltage is generated; and when P sel line is low, the
generated voltage is reversed to negative. This circuit is used for both read and write
pulse generation. The multiplication product is essentially the accumulated current
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk collected from each column, which are analog signals. Therefore, ADCs
are needed to convert Y into digital signals.
To reduce the hardware overhead of ADCs, a multiplexed scheme is employed
by using a n-bit Read Buffer as shown in Fig. 3.6(a). The scan output from the
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circuit under test is acquired and shifted into a shift register at every test clock cycle.
However, the matrix multiplication takes n bits scan output as the multiplicand, so
it only needs to be done once every n clock cycles. Hence, the Read Buffer holds
the scan output for n cycles while the next n bits are being shifted into the shift
register. In the meanwhile, the ADC conversion can be done in sequential between
columns. For example, if the data is sampled at the same rate as the test clock, only
two ADCs will be needed when the size ratio r ≤ 2. In this case, when the Read
Buffer is updated, both ADCs start to convert the signal Y1 and Yn, and then switch
to Y2 and Yn+1 at the next cycle and so on.
From the discussion in Section V, a memory array refresh frequency fm can be
determined from the scan clock frequency f . During each refresh, the memristor
array needs to be written to its pre-defined value. The entire memory refresh can be
done row-by-row by using a Re-load Buffer and a Row Selector signal, which switches
from the 1st row to the nth row once the write mode is enabled. The number of pulse
generators needed for Vwrite will be reduced to k, and one complete memory refresh
will take n clock cycles to finish. For write operations, a positive voltage pulse writes
memristor cells to ”1”, and a negative voltage pulse writes memristor cells to ”0”.
The buffered data can be used as the P sel signal to control the pulse generator.
In order to secure the memristor matrix content in case of test key leakage, we
only allows the tester to receive multiplied scan data after the scan chain captures
the circuit response. In other words, if the scan chain remains at the Shifting Mode,
the Scan Output will not go through the memristor array. This prevents the attacker
from learning the memristor content by controlling the matrix inputs when the test
key is leaked. The logic diagram of this function is shown in Fig. 3.7. An Output
Select (O sel) signal is generated to determine whether the multiplication should be
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Figure 3.7: Control logic bypasses matrix multiplication when circuit response is not
captured.
bypassed. The control logic monitors the mode of the testing, which is indicated by
the Test Mode Select (TMS) signal. When TMS = 1, the scan chain is in the Shifting
Mode, and when TMS = 0, the scan chain is in the Function Mode. Only after the scan
chain captures the circuit response in the Function Mode, the shifted scan response
will be obfuscated by the memristor array; otherwise, the matrix multiplication will
be bypassed. A counter (Cnt) counts the number of the shifted data. Once a full scan
is completed, the control resets to the Bypass mode until the next full scan starts.
3.7 Simulation Results
In this section, the performance of the proposed technique will be evaluated. Note
that different memristor array sizes will affect the security enhancement. We choose
n = 32 as an example to illustrate the proposed design, and also provide the results
for different memristor size ratio r. Employing the confidence intervals, we define a
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Recovery Index (RI), which can accurately predict the degradation of scan data due
to the retention loss. The refresh frequency can be safely chosen by placing an upper
bound based on the RI.
Figure 3.8: Exponential decay of scan data recovery during destructive reads.
3.7.1 Performance analysis
As discussed before, the memristor array will be loaded with a n×k matrix Φ initially.
This matrix can be randomly generated as long as it is full-rank. The uncontaminated
matrix G can be determined from (3.6). We also normalize the Ĝ matrix by mapping
its values to the range of 0 to 1. Hence, the variance σ2 in (3.10) describes the amount
of possible conductance shifting resulted from each read operation.
The quality of scan data recovery can be evaluated by a reversed Hamming (RH)
index RH(S, S ′) defined as:
RH(S, S ′) = 1−
∑n
1 Hamming(S, S
′)
n
, (3.18)
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which is calculated from the bit-wise Hamming distance between the original scan
response S and the recovered S ′ using the proposed scheme. Thus, the value of the
RH index ranges from 0.5 to 1. When RH(S, S ′) = 1, the recovery is accurate; while
when RH(S, S ′) approaches 0.5, the recovered S ′ is vastly different from the original
scan response S. In Fig. 3.8, the change of RH(S, S ′) during the scan process without
applying memristor refresh is simulated. The memristor array size ratio r is 1 and
the variance σ2 in (3.10) is set to 1e−3, meaning the variance of conductance shifting
caused by the flux mismatch is 0.1% during each read operation. As it can be seen,
when memory refresh is off, RH(S, S ′) quickly drops and approaches 0.5 eventually.
This trend fits the Kohlrausch model as described in (3.3), which is a stretched-
exponential function. In addition, when the size ratio r = 1, the scan data recovered
from the LMSE method become erroneous as soon as the scan starts. Hence, a larger
size ratio is needed for a reliable recovery.
The change of RH(S, S ′) with the increased size ratios is shown in Fig. 3.9 as the
dotted lines. Since statistically scan responses can be considered as random binary
sequences, all S vectors are randomly generated in these simulations. We simulated
four cases where r = 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 2, respectively. Each result shown here is the
average of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. As r increases, the time period during which
the scan data can be reliably recovered increases as well. After that, the data become
too erroneous to be correctly recovered by the LMSE method. Here we define this
time duration as the maximum refresh time (MRT). The trend of the dotted lines
in Fig. 3.9 confirms that the accuracy of the LMSE method improves with more
memristor columns because more data are sampled. Therefore, the parameter r = k
n
determines the memory refresh frequency. At the design stage, a loose bound of the
MRT can be found by exploiting the confidence interval of the LMSE as expressed in
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Figure 3.9: Reduction of reverse-Hamming index RH(S, S′) with respect to read cycles
for different memristor array size ratio r.
86
(3.17). As discussed in Section V, to reliably recover the scan data, the confidence
interval of the estimator should be small (e.g., < 0.5). Based on this fact, we assume
if one estimator bit S˜i has a confidence interval larger than 0.5, the recovered bit is
likely to be erroneous. Hence, a normalized Recovery Index (RI), which describes the
ratio of the estimator bits having a confidence interval no larger than 0.5, is defined
as below:
RI =
Number of
{
S˜i ‖ if c · var(S˜i) ≤ 0.5
}
n
. (3.19)
Apparently, RI = 1 indicates all the estimated S can be trusted, while RI = 0
means none of them can be trusted. The variance of the estimator bit S˜i, var(S˜i),
can be computed from (3.14).
The calculation of RI as a function of clock cycles for the cases where r =
1.25, 1.5, 1, 75 and 2 are presented in Fig. 3.9 as the solid lines. By comparing the
RH(S, S ′) and RI lines, we can see that RI can be used as an accurate model to
predict the MRT for different r configurations. The predicted MRT from a given RI
should act as the loose bound for determining the memory refresh frequency. For
example, in these cases, the memristor array can be refreshed every 1000, 2000, 3000
and 4000 cycles, respectively. The impact of different memristor array sizes is shown
in Fig. 3.10. Under the same error rate, since the memristor array with a smaller
size is read more frequently, the memory content degrades faster. Moreover, a larger
r ratio reduces the memory refresh need with longer MRT. However, it can be seen
in Fig. 3.9 that a larger r also increases the time to obfuscate the scan data. In
addition, different r ratios will affect the hardware overhead as well as the timing and
power performance of the proposed design. This will be discussed in the following
subsection.
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Figure 3.10: Impact of different memristor array sizes and dimension ratios on MRT.
r =k/n
Memristor
(um2)
Read Control
(um2)
Refresh Control
(um2)
Total
(um2)
1.25 87 628 441 1156
1.5 104 628 528 1260
1.75 122 628 614 1364
2 139 628 701 1468
Table 3.1: Circuit implementation area with a 32-row memristor array under different kn
ratios
3.7.2 Overhead analysis
The proposed design for scan obfuscation is suitable for resource-constrained systems
because memristor arrays have high density, low power consumption and fast switch-
ing speed. The size of the memristor array can vary resulting in different refresh
frequencies fm, which also have different implications on the security of the proposed
design. A large array increases the overhead and slows down the memory degradation
as it takes more scan cycles to read through the array. On the other hand, a small
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array may not provide sufficient obfuscation. Here we discuss the implementation of
a 32-row memristor array. Based on the discussion above, the scan response can be
safely recovered with memory refreshes every 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 clock cycles for
k
n
of 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 2, respectively. We implemented the proposed scan wrapper
and estimated the hardware cost for each part of the design as presented in Table I,
where a larger k
n
ratio will increase the size of the memristor array and the memory
refresh circuit. The compatibility of the ADC is also essential to this design due
to the potential overhead. Fortunately, state-of-the-art ADCs allow high resolution
conversion with a very compact circuit. In [80], a 10-bit SAR ADC is reported with
only 36 ∗ 36 um2 in 65nm technology. Alternatively, the column level ADCs [81]
widely used in image sensor arrays are well-suited for the proposed design. ADCs are
integrated into the ∼ 10um pitch columns and share the common logic so that they
can covert data in parallel at a high sampling rate and high resolution. In Table II,
we present the normalized hardware overhead of several designs from the ISCAS’89
Benchmarks [82] and a pipelined AES-256 encryption core [83] for k
n
= 1.25. The
area of the two ADCs is estimated based on the column level ADC design in [81]. As
shown, the hardware cost of the proposed design is very small, i.e., about 10%. For
encryption designs such as AES-256, the overhead of the proposed scan wrapper is
only 0.6%.
In Table II, the test lengths generated by an automatic test pattern generator are
also shown for each benchmark design. To achieve the required fault coverage, the
test length will grow dramatically as the design complexity increases. Considering the
size of the test patterns for modern ICs, the time for inserting and checking the test
key at the beginning of the test does not cost a lot of time. It only needs to be done
once and after that tests can start normally. Based on the scan operation described
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Benchmark
# of
Flip-Flops
# of Gate
Equivalents Length of Test Area(um2)
%Overhead
(with ADC)
s9234 228 5597 108774 20683 11.63
s13207 669 7951 329639 37781 6.37
s35932 1728 16065 143506 85493 2.81
s15850 597 9772 309763 40953 5.87
s38417 1636 22179 1800699 99786 2.41
s38584 1452 19253 1110091 87396 2.75
AES-256 [83] 2700 125196 664200 310952 0.6
Table 3.2: Hardware overhead comparison with benchmark circuits
Memristor
(uW )
ADC
(uW )
Shift register
(uW )
Data buffer
(uW )
Decoder
(uW )
Pulse generator
(uW )
Total
(uW )
0.352 76.54 44.42 3.46 17.35 0.95 143.07
Table 3.3: Power consumption of the proposed scan wrapper based on a 32 × 48
memristor array.
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Lock
& Key [59]
Test
wrapper [60]
Scan
encryption [63]
This
work
# of sub-chain 4 8 12 NA NA NA
Area
overhead(%)
s38417 2.9 5.7 50.8 13.5 * 2.41
s38584 3.8 7.5 66.8 26.6 * 2.75
AES core * 5.2 1.39 0.6
Timing
overhead(%) * * 0.8 2.4
Table 3.4: Overhead comparison with related works (’*’ stands for data not provided in
the reference)
in Section VI, the overall redundant test time is mainly caused by the memory refresh
which is linearly dependent upon the refresh frequency fm as well as the time cost
for each refresh. Since in this design the memristor array is refreshed row by row, the
time for each refresh takes n clock cycles. On the other hand, the multiplexed read
operation in Fig. 3.6 (a) minimizes the time redundancy during read operations. The
additional time cost is n clock cycles for shifting the first n scan data. The total scan
time of the proposed design can be expressed as:
T =
(lt + n+ q)
f
+
lt
fm
× n, (3.20)
where lt is the length of the test, q is the length of the test key, f is the test clock
frequency, and fm, k, n are the frequency of memristor refresh and implemented array
sizes, respectively. Apparently, the impact of n and q becomes less significant when
the test length l is long. In the case of the pipelined AES-256 core, if the memristor
array is implemented with 32 rows and 48 columns, it is safe to refresh the memristor
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array at the frequency of fm = f × 2000. Thus, the time overhead of this test is only
2.4%.
To evaluate the power consumption of the proposed design, we simulated each cir-
cuit component using the SPICE tool. The estimated power consumption is presented
in Table III. These results were obtained at the clock frequency of f = 10MHZ for
a 130nm technology. The read voltage Vread is set to 0.3V and the other operations
are with VDD = 1.2V . The largest power consumption is from the ADCs because
high-speed ADCs are needed to meet the test requirement for high-speed ICs [84].
From these results, even at the high frequency, the overall power consumption is in
the order of 100µW .
In comparison with the prior works, our design features significant reduction in
area, power with less or comparable timing overhead. A detailed comparison with
some existing works are given in Table 3.4. The scan output re-ordering method [59]
introduces an area overhead ranging from 3.8% to 66.8% when dividing the scan chains
into 4 to 12 sub-chains on the s38584 benchmark circuit. The test time also increases
as more sub-chains are used for higher security levels. The scan test wrapper [60] built
upon the IEEE 1500 standard reports 20% − 50% area overhead for the similar set
of benchmarks. By implementing an additional light-weight block cipher algorithm
to the scan chain, small area (1.39%) and timing (0.8%) overheads are achieved [63].
However, the testability problem of the additional cipher logic remains unsolved. It
is worth mentioning that, while minimizing area and timing overhead is important
for designing scan infrastructures, low power is also importance, as large power con-
sumption can negatively affect circuit reliability, or cause difficulties in performance
verification. Previous studies on secure scan chain designs often overlook this issue.
Hence, we compare with the encryption circuit data path obfuscation technique [21],
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which introduces 12.2−13.6mW power overhead when implemented on an AES chip.
3.7.3 Security analysis
The proposed secure scan wrapper provides a high level of security to the scan data.
As discussed before, conventionally scan security is enhanced by employing pseudo-
randomness generated by circuits such as LFSR, or randomly inserted a limited num-
ber of dummy elements. In contrast, the proposed memristor-based technique intro-
duces true randomness as it relies on the intrinsic memristor state drafting process.
In general, scan-based attacks utilize the internal round computation results obtained
from the scan chain to retrieve the key information of DUT (e.g., cryptographic cir-
cuits). For example, the attack method on a DES cipher in [3] mainly relies on the
pattern of the S-box where each S-box output corresponds to only 4 out of 64 ad-
dresses. Hence, by knowing three S-box outputs from the scan chain one can uniquely
determine the round key. However, the obfuscated scan responses greatly increase
the possible results of locating the S-box input from the output. For example, if the
64-bit S-box output (coming from 16 sub S-boxes) contains one bit error, for each
plaintext a total of C164 possibilities need to be considered. Moreover, three plaintexts
are needed to uniquely find the round key, which makes the total complexity become
C1643 = 262, 144, meaning that the same method will produce 262, 144 possible round
keys. When the error rate increases, the avalanche effect between multiple steps
quickly increases the number of possible keys that the attacker needs to consider.
The attack complexity can be calculated as:
ATCK COMP = CHn Nstep . (3.21)
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where H is the Hamming distance between S and S ′, derived from RH(S, S ′), and
Nstep is the number of attack steps. In Fig. 3.11, we present the attack complexity
based on the simulations with an array size n = 32 and k = 40. Hamming distance
H is rounded to its nearest integer. The attack step is chosen to be three [3] for the
purpose of illustration. As the testing proceeds, the increased error rate drastically
increases the complexity of the attack. For example, at RH(S, S ′) = 0.95, the attack
complexity is already in the order of ∼ 108(∼ 226). Moreover, the described attack
model is optimistic. In reality, the matrix Φ is private. Also, some preliminary attack
steps, such as identifying the scan structure, will introduce additional complexities
as well.
Figure 3.11: The complexity of breaking the proposed technique as the error rate
increases.
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3.8 Conclusion
Modern IC systems suffer from severe security threats. The scan chain structure has
been exploited as one the most capable hardware side channels. In this paper, a secure
scan chain design is developed by exploiting the retention loss of memristor devices. It
distinguishes the authorized and unauthorized users by checking the test key, and ob-
fuscates scan responses for unauthorized users by introducing true randomness from
decayed memory content. The propose technique can be adopted by conventional
scan designs without modifying the scan chain structure. In addition, the analog-
based memristor array is exploited for more compact design and to introduce more
randomness. A multiplexed read process is utilized to minimize the hardware over-
head. The results show that this technique only introduces minor hardware, timing
and power overhead. Future work is directed to more in depth performance analysis
incorporating fabricated memristor cells, thorough theoretical analysis on the opti-
mization of security versus error rate, and exploiting the memristor based security
enhancement scheme against other type of hardware attacks.
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Chapter 4
Masked FPGA bitstream
encryption via partial
reconfiguration
4.1 Introduction
Along with the ever-increasing demand for system design flexibility, field programmable
gate array (FPGA) devices have become popular in recent years with its grown ca-
pacity and complexity. Modern FPGA devices are usually equipped with millions
of logic gates, various interfaces, megabytes of memory and even processor cores to
support diverse applications. With the reconfiguration capability, they also exhibit
promising potentials on resource constrained end device applications where flexibility
is desired. As a result, protecting the data processed and the design implemented
on FPGA devices has become a critical problem. The most common FPGA device,
SRAM-programmed FPGA, is vulnerable to the so-called ”cloning” attack, where
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malicious users can reverse engineer the entire design by acquiring the FPGA design
bitstream [85], [86]. Therefore, bitstream protection is widely employed in modern
FPGA vendors to support end-to-end confidentiality by utilizing symmetric cryptog-
raphy schemes [87]. For example, Xilinx FPGA starting from the Virtex-II family
to the recent 7 series use Triple-DES (data encryption standard) or AES (advanced
encryption standard) in the Cipher Block Chain (CBC) mode [88], [89]. Encryption
is completed by CAD tools (e.g. Vivado or ISE), and decryption is conducted by the
FPGA on-chip decryptor. The cipher key is stored at the CAD software and on-board
memory symmetrically [87] [88].
However, encryption-based protection can still be broken by side channel attacks
(SCA), which extract the secret information by means of analyzing physical leakage
from power, timing, electromagnetic and scan chains while the cryptographic circuit
is running. Recent reports have shown the security of various encryption systems is
vulnerable to side channel attacks [89] [90]. The underlying coherence between the
side channel information and secret keys or design structures can be analyzed through
thousands of attacking operations. The countermeasures against SCA usually rely on
masking , which removes the dependency between side channel information and secret
keys via randomizing the encryption computing process.
The major concern of applying the crypto masking approach on FPGA is large
hardware overhead, A variety of efforts have been made to minimize the cost of
masking by exploiting the Galios Field operation [91], cryptographic structure [20],
memory space optimization and FPGA resource characteristics [92]. But the masked
implementations are still burdened with large overhead, twice as large as the original
on the most compact design [93] and even more on others [94], making it impractical
for resource constrained applications. At the same time, the flexibility of turning
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Figure 4.1: Masking flow of AES s-box
on/off encryption is also desired for the purpose of maximizing the performance.
In this paper, we propose a light-weight and flexible masking solution for FPGA
bitstream encryption/decryption by exploiting the dynamic partial reconfiguration
property of modern FPGA devices. The proposed design will be mainly discussed on
AES systems, yet the idea can be extended to other encryption systems such as DES
with similar structures.
4.2 Preliminaries
The AES algorithm consists of four steps: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
AddRoundKey, where SubBytes (all known as s-box) is non-linear procedure and
the other ones are linear operations. These four steps iterate for multiple rounds
(number of rounds depends on the key length) and encrypt the plaintext with round-
key during each round of computation. Among these steps, the linear computations
are confusion steps which is used to complicate the plaintext, while the non-linear
step is the diffusion step where real data dissipation occurs. Adding random mask-
ing on linear steps is straightforward. For example, Boolean masking of a plaintext
bit a is conducted y XORing with random bit X to obtain a masked bit am = a
⊕
X,
and this can be reversed by a second XOR operation a = amxorX. Additive and
multiplicative masking are based on the similar mechanism. However, masking the
non-linear computation is complicated. In AES algorithm, the s-box is applied on
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each byte and the computation of which is composed by two steps: 1) consider the
byte an element of Galois Field GF(28), and find its inversion; 2) multiply the re-
sulting byte with a given matrix and then add a given constant vector (an affine
transformation). The principle of masking the s-box can be depicted as in Fig. 4.1,
where a is unmasked s-box input byte, X is the corresponding random mask byte and
X1 is the affine transformation of X. Since the affine transformation is also linear, the
key is to implement the masked version of inversion in GF(28), which involves compli-
cate algorithm modification and is the main source of the implementation overhead
as well as the performance loss.
Therefore, the implementation of s-box masking is critical for masking implemen-
tation of AES. In general, this can be realized on FPGA designs by two kinds of
approaches: 1) pre-compute and store the masked s-boxes; or 2) do masking compu-
tation on the flight. The former approach takes advantage of the FPGA structure,
where s-box (or masked s-box) can be easily implemented as look-up-table (LUT).
However, this method requires designers to pre-store one additional s-box for each
possible mask value, hence they either need to compromise the flexibility of updat-
ing the mask value, or bear with large resource utilization. On the other hand, the
second kind of approach is subject to high redundancy and performance loss as well
due to the required algorithm modifications. Many efforts have been made in terms
of simplifying the implementation of GF inversion. In [20], the authors applied the
”Tower Field” algorithm which represents the GF(28) inversion in sub-fields GF(24)
and GF(22) to minimize the implementation complexity, but still results in ∼ 3 time’s
longer processing time, and ∼ 3 time’s resources utilization compared to un-masked
design. The simplified represented is also adapted for optimized LUT structure and
implemented in [94] on FPGA devices. However, the implementation reports ∼ 6
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(a) Original non-masking Design
(b) Proposed Masked Design (c) Decryption Flow
Figure 4.2: Proposed Design
times LUTs units and ∼ 7 times slices units and extra registers compared to un-
masked reference s-box design.
4.3 Partial reconfiguration based FPGA bitstream
decryption
4.3.1 Motivation
As it’s mentioned before, the FPGA bitstream protection usually rely on symmetric
ciphers such as AES. The application bistream, which is encrypted in CAD software,
will be decrypted by decryptor core during chip boot-up, and SCA attack can easily
compromise the encryption key during the downloading process. Existing masking
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designs suffer from high resource overhead which makes it impractical for resource
constrained embedded system designs. However, the modern FPGA devices are often
equipped with dynamic and partial reconfiguration (DPR) features [88], [95], which
supports more flexibility on FPGA based systems. Through special internal ports
(such as ICAP on Xilinx devices), one or more portions of the FPGA logic can
be dynamically modified while the remaining portions are operating normally. In
this work, we propose to utilize the DPR capability of FPGA to design a novel
bitstream protection flow, where the side channel resilience can be achieved with
efficient hardware utilization and low latency design.
The masked AES decryptor in the proposed design will be implemented on FPGA
as well, instead of the commercial decryption ASIC solutions. When bistream encryp-
tion is required, the user need to download the decryptor before boot up the system.
The AES implementation on FPGA is highly modularized, where the s-box can be
implemented as LUTs for resource utilization efficiency. By exploiting the DPR fea-
ture, the masking of s-box can be realized by dynamically updating the s-box module.
In this way, it neither requires complicated algorithm modification nor large storage
space. Besides, changing masking value can be conducted by acquiring new masked
s-box from software. Hence, high flexibility and security can be achieved by pro-
posed solution. Furthermore, in resource constrained scenarios, the decryption logic
in the proposed design can be erased after the configuration of the main application
bitstream, so that extra resources are released for non-secure modules.
101
4.3.2 The Proposed Design
The proposed design of DPR-based FPGA bitstream configuration process is depicted
in Fig. 4.2, and the original non-masking design is also illustrated. In Fig. 4.2a,
an application bitstream is generated and encrypted by CAD software, and then
decrypted by an on-chip FPGA decryptor for the purpose of bitstream configuration.
The encryption/decryption process relies on a symmetric key, which is stored in the
on-chip FPGA memory powered by an external battery [96]. As discussed in the
previous sections, side channel analysis is able to retrieve this secret key and therefore
acquire the entire application design.
To efficiently mask the downloading process and protect the bitstream from side
channel attacks, the proposed design divides the bitstream configuration process into
four steps, as shown in Fig. 4.2b. At step 1, the CAD tool generates the AES bitstream
and implements on the FPGA for the decryptor (denoted as DECR′) without encryp-
tion/decryption. The implemented DECR′ has two sets of s-box LUTs so that it can
run at both non-masked and masked modes. The s-box LUT located at the masked
data path is denoted as S′. At step 2, the CAD tool generates the partial bitstream
including the pre-computed s’-box, random mask X as well as its modified values
corresponding to the different AES steps. This partial bitstream will update DECR′
especially the S′ part while DECR′ is running at the non-masked mode. Step 3 is the
application bitstream downloading process. Similar to the original design, the main
application that contains secret designs will go through the encryption/decryption
process with DECR′ running at the masked mode to prevent side channel attacks.
Step 4 is more flexible in that DECR′ can be totally erased or S′ can keep on up-
dating based on different applications. For example, in IoT applications with limited
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resources, it is a good choice to erase the decryptor and allocate other normal designs
on the FPGA. On the other hand, if an application will continue to configure secure
designs or serve in data communications, DECR′ can be reused and S′ will be updated
through the partial bitstreams.
The decryption flows of both non-masked and masked modes are illustrated in
Fig. 4.2c. In the non-masked design, the data flow is from the encrypted input A to
the decrypted output E, and Ki represents the secret key at the i
th round. The data
flow of the masked design is similar to the non-masked one, with each intermediate
result masked with a random number, i.e., X is the random mask and X1 to X3
represent the modified values after each AES steps. Modified InByteSub is the inverse
s-box process of decryption, which is labeled as S′ in Fig. 4.2b.
The proposed design is realized through preparing bitstreams of different parts and
pre-storing them in the boot memory, as shown in Fig. 4.3. Masking based FPGA
bitstream configuration is achieved through the FPGA “Boot from Memory” option,
following the above four steps. In Fig. 4.3, SRAM-based FPGA is divided into two
memory spaces, which are “Configuration Memory I” reserved for the main appli-
cation with secret designs, and “Memory II” for decryptor allocation with masked
AES protection. Additionally, the decryption logic is also separated to the static and
dynamic parts, to determine which modules will be included to the partial bitstream
for decryptor update. There are two sets of inverse s-box, one for the static part
for non-masking use and the other served as dynamic logic. It is crucial to protect
the random mask value from the attackers, otherwise the masking will be invalid.
Thus, the dynamic part also needs encryption. In general, there are four blocks pre-
pared and stored in the boot memory. They are the main application bitstream with
encryption, the static decryptor parts without encryption, the encrypted dynamic
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Figure 4.3: Overview of boot memory space and configuration memory space for the
proposed SCA masked FPGA security system
decryptor parts, and other non-secure application bitstreams that can be loaded to
the FPGA without encryption for better performance.
Since partial bitstreams only have the memory mapping of the target logics, their
file size is quite small compared to either main application bitstreams or decryptor
static parts, resulting in negligible boot memory overhead. Compared to the non-
masked designs, the resource overhead only comes from an extra set of s-box and
the DPR control logic. Through exploiting the dynamic and partial reconfiguration
features of modern FPGA, the proposed design only has minor overhead compared
to the traditional non-masked approach. This will be verified by the implementation
results in the next section.
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4.4 Implementation and Results
To evaluate the proposed approach, we implemented an AES decryption circuit using
the partially reprogrammable feature on Xilinx Zedboard, which is based on Xilinx
Zynq-7000 all-programmable SOC and combined with a Cortex-A9 processor. The
FPGA chip has 85, 000 programmable logic (PL) cells, 53, 200 LUTs, 220 DSP slices,
up to 104Mhz clock and 100Mhz configuration speed. The tcl-based script is used
for building the design, generating the bitstreams, and interacting with the board.
The masked inverse-sbox is computed in software separately.
4.4.1 Circuit Implementation
The AES circuit is configured with both a static region and a dynamic region. The
static logic consists of a complete decryption core with modifications to support the
masking mode and PR control logic. The dynamic logic mainly contains the masked
inverse-sbox and the registers to hold random mask values. We use ICAP ports to
access the internal configuration memory through the user logic. Since our system
does not use the embedded processor to control the PR process like other dynamic
PR systems, the PR control is light-weight and free from process bus delays. The
system implementation is shown in Fig. 4.4. In this paper, we implemented a compact
AES decryptor, which supports 128bit and 256bit key lengths. The implementation
is iterative with four inverse s-boxes and processes 128bit words. The maximum
throughput of the decryptor is 278Mbps on Xilinx 7 series FGPAs.
As discussed before, the full bitstream is first downloaded to the FPGA and
then the decryption core starts to operate in the non-masked mode. Afterwards,
the PR controller sends the partial bitstream to the decryptor for decryption, and
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Figure 4.4: Circuit implementation of the bitstream decryption module.
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Resource Utilization slice LUT slice Register F7 mux F8 mux
AES decryptor 2088 2894 95 0
SCA masked AES decryptor 2266 2859 159 32
DPR control 166 70 0 0
Dynamic module 590 4 0 0
Table 4.1: Resource utilization of unmasked AES decryptor and masked decyptor with
dynamic PR
Implementation Ref [91] Ref [97] Ref [94] Ref [98] This work
Resources Overhead 106.78% 60.1% 95.10% 75.84% 21.06%
Note: on-slice components are merged together for the calculation
Table 4.2: Resource utilization of unmasked AES decryptor and masked decyptor with
dynamic PR
the decrypted partial bitstream is used to reprogram the dynamic module. This is
required as the mask value needs to be protected. Note that if the inverse s-box is
configured to be a dynamic block, the entire partial bitstream needs to be stored
until it is fully decrypted. In order to avoid using extra memory and control logic,
in this work we implemented a dual subByte (s-box) structure, where the unmasked
subByte module is implemented as the static logic, and a separate subByte module
is also implemented in the dynamic logic that contains the masked s-boxes. In this
way, the masked s-box can be reprogrammed in parallel with the partial bitstream
decryption. The generation of the partial bitstream is based on the masked inverse-
sbox computed in software. We set the ICAP to 32 bits, hence only a 128bit buffer
is needed to buffer the decrypted bitstream before sending it to the configuration
memory.
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4.4.2 Resource Utilization
The FPGA resource utilization of the DPR masked AES decryptor is reported and
compared with the original unmasked design in Table I. We implemented a compact
AES decryptor because the bitstream decryption does not require a high throughput,
as the application downloading speed is also constrained by the memory configuration
speed. Both the original and the masked designs implemented four inverse s-boxes to
process 32bit data at once, which is also the standard data width of FPGA interface.
Naturally, the same masking scheme can be extended to implementations with fewer
inverse s-boxes to reduce resource utilization or more inverse s-boxes LUTs to improve
throughput.
As shown in the Table, the circuit overhead mainly comes from the additional
dynamic module and the DPR controller. Due to the partial reconfiguration feature
and dual subByte structure, the resource utilization of the masked AES decryptor
core is comparable with the original design, with minor overhead from the masking
mode support circuit. Four inverse s-boxes are implemented by 590 6-input LUTs.
Note that an 8-in-1 LUT can be implemented with 5 6-input LUTs, which means one
s-box or inverse s-box can be implemented with 80 LUTs under circuit optimization.
In addition, on Xilinx 7 series FPGAs, one slice consists of four LUTs. Thus the
overhead from the dynamic masked subByte module (with four inverse s-boxes) can
be contained to 80 slices. As discussed before, the compact DPR controller is possible
as the DPR flow does not require processor interface and internal memory control.
To illustrate the resource improvement of the proposed design, we also compared
this work with several existing designs. Since different designs are based on different
AES baselines for various throughput requirements, the overheads are normalized by
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their own AES designs without masking and summarized Table. II. Note that on-slice
resources such as LUTs and registers are merged together to calculate the overhead
so that the uniform standard can be applied. Based on this comparison, the proposed
design achieves the least resources overhead.
4.4.3 Performance Analysis
The portable ICAP module is used in this design for the DPR feature, which supports
up to 100Mhz reconfiguration speed, the fastest among all supported ports. Given
the ICAP bandwidth BW , the reconfiguration throughput is
Picap = BW · f (4.1)
In this system, the data width of the ICAP is set to be 32 bits. Hence, the
maximum reconfiguration throughput is 400Mbps. As mentioned before, the maxi-
mum throughput of AES decryptor core with four inverse s-boxes is 278Mbps, which
determines the time requirement for DPR. The partial bitstream generated in this
design is 206kB, which takes about 0.7ms to download. The FPGA bitstream size
is proportional to the amount of the memory to be configured. Therefore, the initial
setup time can also be shortened if a small configuration memory is designated for the
decryption protocol. On the other hand, the resource utilization is more critical in
this application since bitstream downloading only needs to be done once at power-up.
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4.5 Conclusion
As the modern block cipher based FPGA bitstream protection schemes are threat-
ened by SCA attacks, in this paper, we proposed a side-channel masked FPGA bit-
stream security system which is suitable for flexible security protocols and hardware
resource limited implementations. The dynamic partial reconfiguration feature of
the FPGA devices is exploited to overcome the high circuit redundancy caused by
making the non-linear components in traditional masking designs. The designated
self-reconfiguration flow requires minimal resources for control logic and internal mem-
ory storage. The prototyped system has shown that the PR based masking scheme
achieves a lot of overhead decreasing compared to conventional designs, which is de-
sired in resource constrained systems.The future work will be dedicated in developing
a software-aided bitstream protection system where more flexibility in terms of choice
of protocols, cipher configuration, and mask values can be supported.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, the challenges in designing secure embedded hardware which suit
for the increasing demand for cost, efficiency and flexibility are discussed. Compre-
hensive consideration is required during each step of IC production flow and various
design aspects, so as to establish security countermeasures from early design stage un-
derstanding and hence with minimized redundancy and performance penalty. Based
on this idea, several works are presented. First, the FSM based design vulnerabil-
ity analysis framework is presented which the new probabilistic evaluation metric
indicating the circuit design vulnerability against fault injection. Second, a novel
compact and high security scan chain design architecture is proposed exploiting the
random forgetting effect of memristor devices. Last, we discussed the feasibility and
efficiency of using dynamic partial reconfiguration feature of FPGA device for imple-
menting flexible masking countermeasure against side channel analysis on bistream
encryption and decryption.
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